Moral Horizons of Land and Place

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Abstract: A recent ‘moral turn’ in anthropology has cast new light on morality as a subject of ethnographic inquiry, and on the making of moral meaning and judgment. This article, and the special issue it prefaces, contribute to this emergent literature through foregrounding and examining the moral dimensions of land and place. Taking up Didier Fassin’s injunction for a critical moral anthropology—rather than an anthropology of morality—we look to land and place as groundings for moral challenges and practices that are nevertheless not place-bound. A critical moral anthropology of land and place should be directed, we argue, to the interplay of mobility and emplacement, to the dynamics of landscape and ‘dwelling’, and to the multiplicities of expectation and meaning that surround the making and exploitation of resources. In contexts of global and local change, land and place offer productive grounds from which to consider the moral horizons—both spatial and temporal—of our world and our discipline.

Keywords: Moral anthropology; Emplacement; Mobility; Landscape; Resources
Introduction

Recent years have seen something of a ‘moral turn’ within anthropology. The discipline has long been concerned with various ethical challenges related to fieldwork and the tasks of anthropological writing, particularly post the ‘writing culture’ debates (Clifford and Marcus 1986, Wagner 1981) and has itself often been complicit in normatively-framed projects, including colonising ones as well as subaltern struggles for land and other rights (Kirsch 2007, 2014, Hale 2006). Nevertheless, anthropology has historically paid little attention to morality itself as a focus of ethnographic inquiry, to the moral worlds and practices of diverse people, or to the making of moral meaning and judgment. Didier Fassin (2012a), Monica Heintz (2009), Signe Howell (1997a), Jarret Zigon (2007, 2008), Joel Robbins (2004, 2007), John Barker (2007) and James Laidlaw (2002) are amongst those who have begun to address this gap, producing rich and varied insights into the nature and practice of morality, including in a context of global change that posits new moral dilemmas (Sykes 2012). This special issue contributes to this emergent literature through foregrounding and examining the moral dimensions of land and place. These have been under-theorized within the extant anthropological literature on morality, (although not entirely neglected [Heyman and Symons 2012, Rapport 1997]), and our premise in this special issue is that they offer productive grounds from which to consider the shifting moral horizons of both our world and our discipline.

In examining these fields of moral action and deliberation, the papers gathered in this special issue also seek to contribute to the longer established anthropological literatures on land and place, including those anchored in a political ecology approach. Key elements of these literatures are discussed later in this introduction, including those relating to emplacement, landscape and ‘dwelling’ (Ingold 2000), and resource use and conservation. In a contemporary world that is frequently described in terms of mobility (Bauman 2000, Urry 2007) and deterritorialisation (Appadurai 1996, Papastergiadis 2000), anthropological attention to morality offers new angles on the significance of human connection to land and place, and indeed on our own enmeshing within more-than-human ecologies.

In offering such an examination, the contributors to this special edition are guided by Fassin’s (2012a, b) recent call, not for an anthropology of morality but rather for a critical moral anthropology. Such a project seeks to move, he argues, beyond a consideration of moralities as distinct and particular objects to study, to see instead that ‘moral questions are embedded in the substance of the social’, inextricably bound up in and through all aspects of social life (Fassin 2012b, 4). A critical moral anthropology should also, in Fassin’s imagining, go beyond the consideration of ‘local moral worlds’ that have been the focus of some other studies (Barker 2007, Heintz 2009, Howell 1997a, Zigon 2008). Responding to this injunction, the contributors to this edition remain attentive to the ways in which places—even ‘local’ places—are never only local. Ute Eickelkamp’s article, for example, charts the ‘ethics across borders’ of her Indigenous Agangu informants on their pilgrimage to the Holy Land from their Central Australian desert homelands. Patrick Guinness, meanwhile, explores the conceptualisation of place by Maututu in Papua New Guinea’s West New Britain Province, in terms of expanding and contracting horizons that call for exploration, not the establishment of
boundaries. The best of the anthropological literature on land and place, we argue, has countered the layered binaries of local/emplaced/traditional and global/mobile/modern, pointing instead to their subtle and shifting imbrications. Our efforts within this special issue to resist the boundedness both of places and of moral questions, then, mark a key point of intersection between this literature, and the anthropological literature of morality.

In a context of global change land is variously—often simultaneously—articulated as property, territory, birthright, resource, cultural heritage, homeland, a site and object of belonging, a site of memory and identity (Stead 2015). In this context, we ask first: what are the moral imperatives and practices that emerge from, or else inform, these diverse articulations of land in the contemporary world? Second, we ask: what are the moral dimensions of human roles in relation to land and place? These roles include, but are not limited to, customary landowner, investor, property owner, guardian, producer, indigene, defender, resource extractor, tourist, scientist, consumer, recreationist. As with the diverse articulations of land, these are increasingly propelled into complex configurations that are often, although not always, marked by qualities of ‘friction’ (Tsing 2005), incommensurability (Povinelli 2001, 2012), and intractability. Finally, we ask: what are the moral challenges and dilemmas that emerge when we, as anthropologists, intervene in land and place as codifiers, activists or allies, or indeed simply as outsiders? To ask this is to engage with questions in many ways familiar to the discipline—about the ethics of our practice and the moral dilemmas of representation—but to do so through situating these as part of ‘the substance of the social’ (Fassin 2012b, 4) within which moral questions are embedded. That is, we seek to engage with the moral dilemmas of our own practice as these emerge within landscapes that are, already, dense with moral meaning. In addressing these questions we identify three key thematics to which a critical moral anthropology of land and place might be directed. Considered in more detail below, these are: the interplay of mobility and emplacement, the dynamics of landscape and ‘dwelling’, and the multiplicities of expectation and meaning that surround the making and exploitation of resources.

Anthropology’s ‘moral turn’

One reason for the relative neglect of morality within anthropology has been a Durkheimian tendency to conflate morality with culture, and to see it as ‘everywhere present but almost invisible’ (Robbins 2007, 294); as meaning ‘everything and nothing’ (Laidlaw 2002, 313). Of course, as Barker (2007) notes, details of moral codes and ethics have often been amongst the data collected by anthropologists in their fieldsites, but morality (to the extent it has been subsumed within ‘culture’) has rarely been conceptually foregrounded.

Much of the recent anthropological scholarship on morality has been concerned, then, to inquire more precisely and definitively into the nature and location of the moral. The Durkheimian tradition conceptualised morality in terms of the moral codes and systems of particular societies. In this view, moral action was that which adhered to a culture’s norms. Social ties were understood to produce a strong compulsion towards adherence, and this adherence became a means through which a society, and its moral codes and systems, were
reproduced (Robbins 2007). ‘Moralities’, in this conceptualisation, were largely bounded and stable, much like the ‘cultures’ onto which they were mapped.

Within the context of the more recent, and more sharply focused anthropological scholarship on morality, Fassin (2012b) identifies a shift in focus away from this conceptualisation of moral codes and towards a Foucauldian/Aristotelian emphasis on the construction of ethical subjects. In this view, morality is the exercise of freedom and choice (Laidlaw 2002), constitutive of selves and of action in the world (Howell 1997b). Morality, understood as such, is intimately linked to personhood and to the making of one’s self into a ‘certain kind of person’ (Laidlaw 2002, 321-322). Here, choice becomes a key consideration in determining what falls within a more tightly defined moral realm. Rules and norms do exist, and influence peoples’ actions, but these are not deterministic. Rather freedom, and hence morality, emerge from the limits of their influence and the space that remains for individual decision-making and choice.

In response, however, other voices within the ‘moral turn’ caution against any singular model of morality, and against an overemphasis on ‘freedom’ as a basis for social action, critically re-engaging the Durkheimian tradition to offer more nuanced accounts of moral codes that also accommodate—or articulate with—accounts of morality-as-choice and individual subjectivity (Heywood 2015, Robbins 2007). Robbins (2007) thus seeks to develop an anthropological account of morality that takes into account both the Durkheimian emphasis on the importance of culture and the reproduction of cultural life, and the important critiques of Durkheimian rigidity made by those who point to freedom, choice, and creativity. In doing this he draws on the notion of value, and on Max Weber’s work on value conflict.

For Weber, cultures consist of a number of different value spheres, each internally consistent but often standing in contradiction or tension with others. Thus, cultural values are in constant conflict, and this conflict is pivotal to shaping cultural life (Robbins 2007). To this, Robbins adds a further, important distinction between the morality emergent from harmony and the morality emergent from conflict:

‘harmony and conflict impose different ethical demands. Harmony within and between spheres puts in place a Durkheimian morality of reproduction, where the rules are clear and the compulsion to follow them very strong. Conflict, by contrast, invites, indeed demands, the kinds of reflexive choice that Laidlaw associates with ethical freedom.’ (Robbins 2007, 299)

In situations of value conflict people become conscious of having to choose between them. It is not that this is the only situation within which morality is part of life—that is, a Durkheimian morality of reproduction is still identifiable in circumstances of cultural harmony. In situations of value conflict, however, Robbins argues, morality often takes on both a heightened visibility and a particular charge in people’s lives and subjectivities. Robbins’s own work with the Urapmin in the Papua New Guinean highlands serves to illustrate his argument. Rapidly converted to Christianity in the late 1970s by way of a
charismatic revival movement, the transformation to Urapmin senses of self and ways of being has produced an intense concern with moral questions.

Transformation—and the moral tensions and questions emergent from that—is likewise a thread running throughout the papers collected in this issue. It runs from Yuka Suzuki’s analysis of the contested claims sparked by land reforms in Zimbabwe, to Siad Darwish’s account of the imbuing of waste and pollution with charged moral meaning in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. Resonant with Fassin’s invocation for a moral anthropology, however, and in gentle contrast to Heintz’s (2009) ‘anthropology of moralities’, the papers in this issue are less concerned with moralities as distinct phenomena, as they are with the deep embedding of moral questions in contexts of both local and global flux.

Another debate within the emergent anthropological literature on morality has been over whether to understand it as transcendent—located outside of, or beyond lived experience and practice—or else manifested within it. Calling for an ethically engaged anthropology, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995, 419) argues for the transcendence of the ethical, insisting that it ‘is precultural to the extent that our existence as social beings presupposes the presence of the other’. ‘That we are thrown into existence at all’, she continues, ‘presupposes a given, implicit moral relationship’, one that prefigures language (Scheper-Hughes 1995, 419). In contrast, Veena Das (2012) and Michael Lambek (2010, 2015) both draw attention to ‘ordinary ethics’, moving away from a consideration of the ethical as transcendent and towards the myriad everyday practices and speech acts through which people become moral subjects. Language, on this view, expresses moral commitments that are deeply embedded in everyday life. For Lambek (2010), ordinary ethics resembles ordinary language—intuitive, often largely unconscious ways of speaking, interacting with, being with others. Echoing Robbins’s attention to moral charge in contexts of conflict, Das explores how the everyday also becomes a realm through which the ethical is enacted in circumstances of extreme moral rupture, and through which life is ‘knitted together again’ in their wake (Das 2012, 145).

While sensitive to Lempert’s critique of the imminence argument—namely that it sees the ethical as everywhere and at all times, thus obscuring the communicative labour through which it is made apparent within social life (Lempert 2015)—the articles collected in this special issue are broadly in agreement with this emphasis on the situated, everyday construction and practice of moral life. Indeed, in foregrounding land and place as sites of relationality and meaning, we seek to point not simply to the ways in which the moral is embedded within day-to-day life and language, but to the ways in which it is grounded. Human relationships to land and place, these papers argue, are both emergent from and constitutive of moral understandings, and place in turn provides a domain through which people engage with, and make moral sense of, each other. Thus, Michèle Dominy maps the complex interplay of settler colonial and postcolonial ecological values in New Zealand’s Banks Peninsula, and the ‘irredeemably paradoxical’, but nevertheless meaningful, moral vision that emerges for an ecological model of postcolonial nationhood. In the Papua New Guinean province of Oro, Victoria Stead charts the similarly fraught moral reckonings with the colonial past and postcolonial present that inhabit the disused, overgrown colonial station of Higaturu.
A moral anthropology of land and place is also, necessarily, political. The imbrication of land and place in the operations of power is evident in settler colonialism’s pursuit of territory (Wolfe 2006), in contests over land as resource and global land grabs (Nalepa and Bauer 2012, Zoomers 2010) and ‘green grabs’ (Fairhead et al. 2012), in the determinations of insiders and outsiders, and in the various deployments of place-attachment as bases for identity and entitlement, including indigenous sovereignties and subaltern struggles as well as the identity claims of hegemonic nation-states. More broadly, moral and political questions are fundamentally entwined. Both are concerned, ultimately, with the ways in which people treat each other. ‘There is always, ultimately, a politics of morality’, writes Fassin (2012b, 15), but the articulation of the moral with the political is another aspect of the recent anthropological work on moralities and ethical subjects that remains under-theorised.

Towards a moral anthropology of land and place

Emplacement

Three key thematic concerns within the anthropology of land and place (including its intersections with geography) provide points from which to consider the possibilities of bringing this broad literature into conversation with the emergent interest in morality. The first of these is emplacement, and specifically the relationship between emplacement and mobility. Doreen Massey (1994), Arturo Escobar (2001), and Edward Casey (1997, 1993) have asserted the persistent importance of place and place-attachment in the contemporary world, and in doing so have pushed back against a tendency within much sociological and some anthropological literature to ascribe mobility as a defining feature of the age. Particularly acute in the early days of scholarship on globalization, this tendency has found expression in ideas of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000), network society and spaces of flows (Castells 2000), deterritorialisation (Appadurai 1996, Papastergiadis 2000), and scapes (Appadurai 1996). ‘We are all in travel’, Zygmunt Bauman put it, ‘whether we like it or not…Thrown into a vast open sea with no navigation charts and all the marker buoys sunk and barely visible’ (1998, 85). As important as this literature has been in conceptualising processes of often dramatic change, however, this somewhat hyperbolic rendering of mobility obscures as much as it illuminates of contemporary human experience. ‘In this ‘globalization craze’, as Escobar argued, ‘place…dropped out of sight’ (2001, 141).

Escobar’s own insistence that culture ‘sits in places’ (2001, 139), and Casey’s call to ‘get back into place’ (1993, 11), then, offered powerful correctives to the direction of much thinking in the early, heady days of globalisation studies, and continue to have significance. The defence of place, as Escobar (2001) shows, can be a locus for theorizing as well as for subaltern political action. Dwelling and the cultivation of place is also, as Casey (1993, 175) argues, a practice of care—both of place and of people—and thus also of morality. This is not to say, however, that forms of connection to place are not changing, nor is it to dismiss the contemporary significance of mobility. Indeed, there is some sense in which the scholarly defence of place has risked reifying it to as great a degree as the counter-posed literature has reified mobility (Weiner 2002). Rather than counter the bifurcated renderings of place/locality/tradition and movement/globality/modernity, the danger is that these are further
entrenched. Arguably the most insightful literature on place, then, has been that which has been concerned with the dynamic interplays of mobility and emplacement. Here, we might look to Massey’s (1994, 146) ‘global sense of place’, as well as to insightful anthropological studies of the imbrications of mobility and emplacement in the practice of everyday life.

Michelle Lelièvre and Maureen Marshall, in a conversation across anthropology and archaeology, argue convincingly for a conceptualisation of place that overcomes the ‘mobile-sedentary dichotomy’ and allows the possibilities of dialectical relationships between these (Lelièvre and Marshall 2015, 439). Offering a useful distinction between movement as an ‘object of observation’, and mobility as an ‘object of study’, Lelièvre and Marshall argue for the entwining of movement and place, which come together in practice as well as in the conceptualisation of mobility: ‘movements work to create places’ (2015, 440). Useful too is Harri Englund’s study of migration and emplacement in Malawi. Seeking to move beyond the ‘tired local-global dichotomy’ (2002, 262), Englund encourages ethnographic attention to the ways in which globalism is itself emplaced, and urges caution in the face of assertions of globalism’s liberatory potentials. ‘Not only is the so-called local an emergent property of nonlocal processes’, he writes, ‘the so-called global also requires particular sites and terrains to operate’ (Englund 2002, 266). Unlike ‘local’, Englund’s use of ‘emplacement’ draws attention to the specific historical and existential conditions within which subjects are always situated. His recognition of the ways in which global transformations also serve to limit and constrain the movement of poor Malawians resonates with the findings of one of our own studies, into the entwining of mobility and emplacement at the site of a proposed Special Economic Zone in Papua New Guinea (Stead 2016). Here, as elsewhere (for example O’Donnell 2001), increased movement of goods and capital is coupled with restrictions on labour. The erection of border fences, meanwhile, and the resultant inability of customary landowners to move through and across place, is also alienation from knowledge, memory, and from forms of social and cultural life. At the same time, however, landowners and their allies draw on practices of both emplacement and global connection to create new ‘worldings’ that resist the hegemonic worlding of neoliberal capital and also defy the narrative of a singular movement towards the global and away from place (Stead 2016, see also Roy and Ong 2011, Wilson and Connery 2007).

It is to this interplay of emplacement and mobility, we argue, that a critical moral anthropology should be directed. Indeed, the few anthropological treatments of morality that have foregrounded considerations of land and place have had this interplay as a key concern. Nigel Rapport (1997) for instance identifies the ways in which moral discourses in a rural English village centred on locality, and specifically on moral assertions linked to belonging and to categories of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, including the proclaimed need to defend landownership against outsiders. These were moral arguments articulated through ‘a tone of voice’ that Rapport identifies as ‘righteous indignation’ (1997, 75). A ‘morality of stasis’ invoked by local discourses is contrasted in Rapport’s ethnography to a ‘morality of movement’ invoked by outsider discourses (1997, 76). Significantly, though, if categories of insider and outsider were granted a symbolic standing as exclusive categories (and landownership conceived of in terms of absolute exclusivity), Rapport shows these to have been, in practice, variable and shifting designators. Elsewhere, Josiah Heyman and John
Symons (2012) approach the US-Mexican border as a site of complex moral reasoning and practice, showing how one’s position in relation to place—whether, for instance, one is considered in or out of place—evokes differing moral positions and entitlements. They point to the nation-state as a form of polity within which moral entitlement and legitimacy is strongly tied to territoriality and to citizenship.

These suggestive, if all too brief, considerations of the intersections of emplacement, mobility and morality gesture towards the potential of further, fuller examination. If claims—and refutations of claims—to connection to place invoke moral stances vis-à-vis others, moral challenges also emerge, we contend, in the shifting terms and distributions of movement and relationships to place. Who moves, and who doesn’t? Why? Under what conditions? What values and judgements are attributed to different practices of both movement and emplacement, and how do these converge to produce different, morally situated subjects? What responsibilities—to place, and to others—are activated when people move or stay put, and how are these inflected by considerations of agency and coercion? The border emerges here as a particularly charged space of moral reckoning, invoking relations of inside and outside, and with potentiality for exclusionary ethics as well as for inclusionary ones. It is at the border that norms of hospitality, welcome, and care for the stranger are most clearly activated or refused.

**Landscape**

A second thematic concern within the anthropological literature on land and place, and relevant particularly to the field of environmental anthropology, is that of landscape. Landscape, as Ton Lemaire explains, can be at once object, experience, and sensation (in Thomas 2012, 169). In the context of modernity it has been, principally, object, made as such through the project of the Enlightenment and the valorisation of science and the laws of nature. These are processes that have involved the disinvesting of the ‘natural’ world of moral qualities, with morality and agency instead rendered the exclusive domains of human agents (Thomas 2012). So conceived, landscape has been approached though the modern gaze as an accumulated, authentic record of the past, an approach that has informed, amongst other things, the development of archaeology as a discipline and practice. This detached perspective also found expression, from the late 16th century, in landscape painting. This represented a particular way of viewing the world that was also the imposition of particular class and socio-economic relations, removing labour from view, for example, and obscuring the connections between landscaped estates, industrial factories, and colonial plantations (Bender 1993, 2002). The critical re-evaluation of landscape, by archaeologists as well as environmental anthropologists, has entailed a challenge to these conceptualisations of landscape, and a re-engagement with landscape’s other meanings and dimensions.

In Tim Ingold’s phenomenological re-evaluation, landscape is constituted by the lives and practices of those who have dwelt in it, and who ‘in doing so, have left there something of themselves’ (Ingold 1993, 152). Landscape thus carries within it the traces of that sociality and of its unfolding across time (Ingold 1993, 2000), but it is not a singular or fixed record. Rather, as Ingold and others writing in a similar vein insist, landscape is constantly in
process. ‘Landscape’, Barbara Bender writes, ‘is time materializing’, always subjective, and always subject to a multivocality of perspectives and interpretations (2002, S103).

What might an orientation to landscape and ‘dwelling’ offer to a critical moral anthropology of land and place? If it is through dwelling in the world that meaning is revealed, constituted through the practical engagements through which people attend to their environments and to one another (Ingold 1993, 2000), then landscape is also the terrain of moral meaning. Landscape becomes a means through which to access, examine, and enact moral relations and imaginaries. At the same time, recognising the particular, contingent perspectives entailed in ‘Western’ (at the risk of simplification) constructions of landscape yields the possibility of other perspectives, including those that do not strip the ‘natural’ world of moral agency. Indeed, landscape, as a context for human life, itself becomes a space of possibility and alterity, entailing a relationship between the everyday and the idealized, between lived reality and other potential, imagined lifeworlds (Hirsch 1995).

Landscape is time and space articulated with one another, and it is at this point of articulation that the notion of the moral horizon takes on a critical dual valence as both temporal and spatial. Returning to Robbins’s invocation to see experiences of social change as periods of heightened moral charge, we might approach landscape, conceived as multivocal recordings-in-process (Bender 2002), as the materialization of that charge, and of the multiple moral possibilities brought into encounter. Indeed, if the project of the Enlightenment disinvested land and place of moral qualities, contemporary experiences of climate and environmental crisis expressed in the idea of the Anthropocene represent, perhaps, their ultimate reinscription.

Resource use and conservation

A third theme within the anthropological literature on land and place that also invites consideration through a moral lens, is that of resources. Resources are not given in the landscape, but rather ‘become’ (Zimmermann 1933, 3), and are as much imaginative and cultural phenomena as they are material ones. Within the ‘economy of expectations’ (Weszkalnys 2011, 352) and ‘economy of appearances’ (Tsing 2000, 118) that accompany the anticipation, exploitation, use and conservation of resources, moral meanings and sentiments proliferate. Resource extraction is associated with violence, conflict, social disintegration and moral decay, as well as with development and moral progress (Weszkalnys 2011), and the making of resources as a social and cultural process always occurs within contexts, and ecologies, of power (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014).

Particularly relevant to a consideration of morality in contexts of value conflict is the way in which resources are imbued with multiple meanings. Michael Taussig (1980), Sidney Mintz (1985), June Nash (1993), and Eric Wolf (1997), each draw attention to the different value systems that can be brought into contact through resource extractive projects. These differences in value and meaning form part of what Tsing theorises, in the context of logging and mining activity in South Kalimantan forests, as ‘friction’, ‘zones of awkward engagement, where words mean something different across a divide even as people agree to
speak’ (Tsing 2005, xi). Resources and resource extraction, as Tsing demonstrates, bring into encounter starkly different forms of relating to, ‘dwelling’ in, and making sense of land and place, and thus also of making sense of what is good and right. Tsing poses the question that emerged in the context of debates over global resource industry in the heady end stages of the Indonesian New Order regime: ‘What if nature is a moral question?’ (2005, 113). Amongst the competing ethics brought into ‘awkward engagement’ for Tsing’s informants are the control of nature as proper human conduct, environmental ‘protection’ as a legal and religious obligation, and ‘global Nature’ (2005, 88) as an abstract universal informing sustainable management and a sense of planetary connectivity.

To these grappling with multiple scales, lifeworlds, and (moral) meanings brought into encounter through resource extractive processes. Veronica Strang (2004) and Emma Ferry (2002, 2005) add to this an awareness of the ways in which local people can themselves hold simultaneous but divergent assessments of the value of a substance. Thus, land can be both a resource to be commoditised in pursuit of ‘development’ and the good life, and an inalienable birthright intrinsic from which alienation is inconceivable (Stead 2017). The simultaneous truth of these things can be deeply destabilising and distressing, even if, as Tsing also shows, ‘friction’ is also a space of creative possibility. What happens to morality in such contexts of contradiction and deep, embodied ambivalence? How do people position themselves in moral relation to each other, and to their own selves? In what moral relations do people find positioned vis-à-vis the world around them, the land and places they move through, and the things that land yields? If we are, moreover, to reinscribe landscape with the possibility of moral qualities and agency, how do land and place themselves respond in these states of unease, uncertainty, and moral multiplicity?

Emplacement, Landscape, and Resource Use and Conservation in Ethnographic Perspective

Our contributors engage the key themes of emplacement, landscape, and resource use and conservation in overlapping and complementary ways while varying in the degree to which they engage each of these. They share a uniformity of engagement with our overall concept, that is, how the moral turn in anthropology provides a productive lens for understanding shifting temporal and geographic horizons of land and place. The articles are both sequenced and juxtaposed in terms of their shared and contrastive spatial and temporal logics, while as the same time their order traces an arc that follows both ethnographers and subjects as they journey through the land they narrate.

As they explore the moral dimensions of human connection to land and place across the horizons of space and time, our contributors consider these connections as simultaneously reflecting and shaping peoples’ moralities. These anthropologists traverse geographically varied and conceptually cognate regions from the remote mountains of the Global south to the busy streets of the urban Global north—the former colonies of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the settler postcolonial states of Australasia, and the post independence states of Tunisia and Zimbabwe. The authors locate their field research in physical, historical, and cultural sites where place making is ongoing—a colonial station, an oil palm plantation, an
outback town, desert homelands, agricultural farms, protected natural areas, tourist destinations, and village and urban streets. Historically, they extend from European settlement encounters in 1840 on Banks Peninsula in Aotearoa New Zealand to the extended history of a West New Britain plantation in 1912 through the oil boom and Christian missionisation; from the mid-century violence in PNG’s Oro Province to early twenty-first century land dispossession in Zimbabwe; from post revolution 2011 Tunis to recent Holy Land pilgrimages, South Island ecological restoration projects, and land based traditions in northern South Australia.

Our contributors engage with their cultural subjects and practices through varied source materials and methods as well as multisited ethnography—ethnohistorical accounts, the colonial archive, oral histories, and current social media and internet websites; commemorative event analysis; customary land tenure and native title legislation; Bible translation; indigenous ontologies and ecological knowledge; and participant observation and interviews. In so doing, they speak to shifting moral discourses in the interplay of emplacement and belonging, in the dynamics of landscape and dwelling, and in the multiplicities of expectation and meaning with regard to resource use and conservation. They address the competing and sometimes incommensurate interests of colonial and postcolonial stakeholders, as well as the motivated engagements and value conflicts of traditional custodians and owners of the land, colonials, settlers, pilgrims, anthropologists, botanists, corporations, government officials and the nation state. In all of these analyses at the interface of diverse articulations of land, the anthropologists’ various roles as moral agents—codifier, interpreter, traveller, scholar-activist, environmental advocate—contribute to anthropology as critique through an emergent critical moral anthropology of land and place.

Victoria Stead challenges a redaction of land to ‘nature’ in her transcendent conception of place and its relationship to the ancestors as essential to emplacement and dwelling in remote Higaturu, Oro Province, Papua New Guinea (PNG). In this cultural and physical site of the Australian executions of Orokaiva men in World War II and of Mount Lamington’s subsequent volcanic eruption, she focuses on the relationship between violence, colonialism, history and memory. The singularity of place figures significantly in her argument for the multiple materialities of this site, one in which history—as situated and narrated and as it ‘sits in places’—becomes a metaphoric natural resource with hoped-for economic and touristic value. This site of narrativity and emplaced memory carries ‘ambiguous moral reckonings’ in Higaturu as the past violence of both men and land converge in present understandings, and as contemporary Orokaiva seek to make moral sense of both their colonial past and postcolonial potentiality.

Across the Solomon Sea, Patrick Guinness carefully traces the evolution of a plantation economy for the Maututu people of West New Britain Province, PNG, by exploring the moral tensions between indigenous values of emplacement and capitalist principles of resource extraction. He examines the morality of exploitation of land and forest resources through the state’s award of logging leases and land purchases for oil palm cultivation to settlers. In his discussion of economic transformation and its engagement with people and land in the gardens where they converge, Guinness explains that morality is a ‘zone of negotiation’.
Maututu settlement places, like those of the Anangu Pinjantjatjara people discussed by Ute Eickelkamp, are entangled with ancestral names that point to relationships as the expression of emplacement and the mutual constitution of place and identity. Taking as his focus the German then-Australian owned plantation, Bialla, he illustrates moral ambiguity in the entanglements of local ontologies of place as Maututu partner with regional and global movements of Christianity, state formation, and global capitalism that violate nature through their destructive ecological processes. Customary land ownership is incommensurable with imposed economic understandings, and ‘custom’ is redefined as it relates to moral expectations of leadership, lineage membership, and village responsibility. Maututu morality, grounded in dwelling and cultivation of place, is at the same time marked by negotiated balance, integration, and compromise, rather than by the bounded absolutes and essential behaviours of colonial settlement, and Christian revivalism. Guinness points to the porosity and infinitude of physical and conceptual horizons as he reveals the entangled ontologies and moralities at the intersection of ‘colonial, capitalist and Christian encompassments’.

Ute Eickelkamp contributes to anthropological discussions about morality and its relationship to Christianity and pilgrimage through her focus on emplacement, dream travel and Bible translation, for neighbouring Anangu Pinjantjatjara. She considers how Anangu Bible translators avoid moral conflicts between land-based Anangu narratives and Biblical-based scriptures while on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem from their northern South Australia desert homelands. In Israel, she argues, Anangu seek to emplace Christ in the physicality of the scriptures’ sacred sites that they visit as tourists. Place making is enacted across geographical, temporal, and ethical borders through the memories they digitise in photographs and recordings on their iPads. As Anangu Pinjantjatjara travellers bear witness, these places are internalised, and they emplace Christ in themselves as they indigenise Christianity. The article addresses how Anangu Christians make sense of these two moral laws while at home in the desert as well. In this way, by following parallel dreaming tracks, and yet clearly compartmentalizing two distinct religious traditions, they embrace the incommensurality inherent in translation and separate their own ancestral lands from those of Christ as a form of resistance against their colonised subject positions.

By developing the conceptual frame of moral geography, Siad Darwish, like Eickelkamp, presents a geography of spatially and morally distinct spaces in Tunis. Darwish examines the interaction of the moral stigma of waste—uncollected garbage, industrial pollution, and raw sewage—with authoritarian environmental ideologies of cleanliness by directing our attention to the post revolution nation state in the aftermath of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime. Integrating archival research with interview and participant observation with residents, NGO workers, activists, and government officials, Darwish argues that Ben Ali’s rule depended on myths of the economic miracle, democratisation, secularisation and environmentalism, which were maintained through controlling information and activists. Moral geographies of cleanliness and waste link the material, economic and political dimensions of life, and the class-based system of social stratification in this post-Revolution city. For Tunisians in reconstituting the nation state, waste is a palpable reminder of the regime’s corruption, and its polluting quality sullies the period and political process of Tunisia’s transition.
Yuka Suzuki also attends to transformations in the meaning of resource use and conservation within the nation state, taking as her focus postcolonial Zimbabwe and the contestations over land redistribution that followed the state’s 1980 independence and the subsequent wave of land reform and invasions of white farms that began in 2001. Suzuki argues that white farmers in the far western community of pseudonymous Mlilo make new claims to belonging that are rooted in their local knowledge of and intimacy with these arid agricultural lands. She explores how their reasoning ‘becomes so hegemonic that it manages to evade recognition as a long-standing trope of colonial ideology’ especially in a context where land has always been fraught with moral uncertainty. The farmers create a positive rebranded image that promotes their inclusion within the nation state. Suzuki argues that this sense of belonging is articulated through ‘imagined roles in relation to land, nature, and environment’ that are linked to the farmers’ successful adaptation to land and place through the wildlife industry they implemented. Depoliticising articulations of moral virtue and technical expertise become a means for Mlilo’s farmers to re-emplace themselves in the lands in which they had dwelled, and then surrendered.

Like Suzuki, Michèle Dominy addresses the shifting significance of emplacement, landscape and resource conservation in the postcolonial state. In Aotearoa New Zealand, an aspirational settler postcolonial moral ecological vision for the nation promotes the simultaneous conservation of biological and cultural diversity. The codification of indigenous Maori ontologies of place has produced national legislation endowing a national park and river with agency and personhood while simultaneously implementing conservation legislation for radical eradication schemes for invasive small mammals. On Banks Peninsula, South Island, Dominy examines the cultural practices and productions linked to the commemoration of European settlement, and the ecological regeneration and restoration projects in the eastern peninsula. Influenced by multispecies studies and theories of invasion ecologies, she illustrates how plants are actors in these ecological narratives, and how endemic species as they hybridise with invasive species become constitutive of a settler postcolonial national identity. She argues that indigenous flora and fauna, landscape and people are irreversibly hybridised rendering entangled ontologies commensurate. Like Stead and Eickelkamp, for whom ‘wayfaring…is neither placeless nor place-bound, it is place-making’ (Ingold 2016, 101), Dominy too traverses local landscapes, as she walks Banks Peninsula Track guiding her readers through a historical, colonial and botanically transformed path of ecological invasion, restoration and regeneration. In this context, just as volcanic landscapes endure traumas over geological time, temporal and spatial moral horizons of land and place embrace a geological timeframe that transcends the ethnographic imaginary.

The articles in this special issue overlap in their connection to our themes of emplacement, landscape and resource use, through their focuses on the destructive consequences of corporate, government and overseas capital investment, wealth generation and tourism, the pressures of Christian missionisation, and the interface between customary land ownership, land legislation, ecological restoration, waste management, and environmental policymaking. Taken together as they negotiate our understandings of intractable encounters and entangled ontological worldviews, they provide a simultaneous expanding ethnographic horizon of global connections, engaging Anna Tsing’s zones ‘of awkward engagement’
where human and non-human mobility, agency, and consequence hover. These contributions are implicit and explicit reminders of both emplacement and the infinitude of horizons (Ingold 2008, 1797), and the ways in which the world impinges from beyond the immediacy of location. At the same time, they remind us of the salience of Tim Ingold’s dwelling perspective where despite mobility and globalisation, we must attend to the relational context of humans’ practical engagement with, care for, and embodied emplacement in their surroundings.

As they engage in diverse physical and conceptual fields of moral action and deliberation, the actors in these analyses—human cultural subjects and anthropologists as well as non-human ancestors, flora, fauna and the land—confront what Martha MacIntyre (2015) has characterised as new apocalyptic forces in the world such as globalisation, climate change, and environmental disaster that challenge us to redirect our focus from cultural loss, persistence, and location to points of cultural convergence on a geological stage. This demands an anthropology that can re-ground itself at these points of convergence, and in doing so attend to the dense moral meanings of land and place.

References


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