Involving Anthropology:

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PHILLIPE DESCOLA

Biolatry: A Surrender of Understanding (Response to Ingold's A Naturalist Abroad in the Museum of Ontology)

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Rejoinder to Descola’s Biolatry: A Surrender of Understanding


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Abstract

Philippe Descola is a self-confessed naturalist. Yet in his book Beyond Nature and Culture, he presents naturalism as just one of four possible ontologies that – for different peoples in different periods – have underwritten human thought and practice. The others are animism, totemism and analogism. In this article I explore some of the paradoxical consequences of his positing naturalism both as a frame for comparative analysis and as one of the terms enframed by it. These have to do with the logic of the ontological four-fold, the conversion of inference into schemas of tacit knowledge, the division between psychological and linguistic constructions of the self, alternative senses of interiority and physicality, the dichotomies between humanity as condition and as species, and between mind and nature, and the proper use of the concepts of production and transmission. I conclude by imagining what would happen if animism, rather than naturalism, were taken as a starting point for comparative understanding. Then life, growth and movement, rather than figuring as the exterior emanations of a world of being, would be restored to immanence in a world of becoming.

Keywords: Animism; Immanence; Interiority; Naturalism; Ontology
Prologue

Ontology has recently become a catchword in social and cultural anthropology. For many, this is part of a wider move against theories of representation that would ascribe human differences, under such rubrics as ‘world-views’ or ‘cultural constructions of reality’, to the multiple and potentially unlimited ways in which minds are able to filter the raw data of sensory experience, and to sort what they allow through into more or less coherent patterns. Ways of knowing the world, say the new ontologists, are inseparable from ways of being in it, and what these ways bring forth are worlds in themselves that can be neither reduced to elementary constituents common to all nor sublimated into superordinate structures of thought. In his magnum opus, *Beyond Nature and Culture*, Philippe Descola (2013) also paints a picture of ontological pluralism. Yet he also comes out as a scholar who is fully and unquestioningly committed to the representational paradigm. For him there is no doubt that a world exists ‘out there’, and that it has to be configured in one way or another in human minds for any sort of practical engagement to ensue. To be sure, Descola’s ‘ontologies’ are not world-views or cultural constructions in the conventional sense; they are rather the more fundamental, generative principles that give rise to them. Like the worlds of the new ontologists, they are not reducible to innate universals, nor can they be siphoned off into constellations of symbolic meaning. Yet here’s the difference: Descola’s ‘ontologies’ serve to bridge the otherwise yawning gap between a universally given world and its particular representations, rather than by treating both what is given and what is known as the derivative offshoots of the being of a world. For the new ontologists, worlds simply *are*, before any possibility of division between the given and the known can arise. But for Descola, this division is an apriori condition that creates the space of possibility for ontologies to mediate between them.

It is not my purpose, in this article, to essay a review of Descola’s book in its entirety, or even to summarise its contents. The sheer scale and scope of the work would render any such attempt well-nigh unachievable, though others have tried (Scott 2014, Salmon and Charbonnier 2014). I seek rather to engage with the book’s arguments, on certain fronts of my own choosing, largely in order to expose the fault lines that divide Descola’s approach from my own. These are profound, though so deeply embedded in the bedrock of the text that they are not easily discerned. As Descola is gracious enough to acknowledge, so convergent are our views on many matters ‘that the detail of what separates us comes to acquire a decisive importance’ (p. xxii).¹ I agree! The attempt to excavate this detail has helped me

¹ Here and in what follows, page numbers refer to the English translation of *Beyond Nature and Culture* (Descola 2013). This is the point at which to acknowledge my profound intellectual debt to Philippe. We have sparred for many years, but in a spirit of conviviality and friendship. He would tell me that it was in order to get away from the surfeit of heavy-duty philosophy to which young scholars are subjected in France that he took flight into ethnography. My education in Britain was just the reverse: I endured a surfeit of ethnography but received no proper training in philosophy at all. Running away from ethnography, it is the philosophy that now lures me on. Our respective ships pass, sometimes in the night, sailing in opposite directions.
personally to clarify my own position, but I think it touches on points where anthropology is itself at a crossroads. I therefore hope that by setting out where our roads meet, and where they go their separate ways, I can also signpost alternative roads for the discipline. For differences there are, and these sometimes lead to misrepresentation. I am glad, therefore, to have this opportunity to set the record straight, and to this end I have tried to be as emphatic as I can about the parting of our respective ways, while perhaps glossing over those areas in which they converge. Some may read this as polemic, and maybe it is. No disrespect is intended. I do think, however, that Descola’s approach is an anachronistic one, and that it belongs more to the museum of ontology than to the dynamic, pulsating, weather-beaten world that we inhabit every day of our lives. I make no secret of the fact that, for me, an anthropology that does its work in the hurly-burly of life in the world can speak more powerfully than one confined to the museum to the most pressing environmental question of our time: how should we live?

So let me make my position plain. I am not a new ontologist, and I do not share their obsession with the multiplication of worlds. On the contrary, that we all inhabit one world is, for me, a core principle of the discipline of anthropology. All too often, it seems to me, this principle has been neglected, along with the challenges and responsibilities it entails, in favour of a facile appeal to plurality. Never one world; always many worlds. Once, these were the many worlds of symbolic culture; now, in the hands of the new ontologists, we have the many worlds of elemental being. Taken to its logical extreme, every being is its own world: you name it, and there’s a world for you (e.g., Harman 2012). Now one could hardly accuse Descola of this kind of ontological proliferation: to the contrary, his ‘relative universalism’ – by which he would have us understand his own approach (p.305) – strains to limit the number and variety of cognitive solutions to the conundrums that all humans face, always and everywhere, in coming to terms with their own existence and that of both human and non-human others. Yet for Descola it appears that these solutions are preconfigured, already available to be entered into the faculties of a human mind that comes innately and universally equipped to receive them. This is where he and I disagree. For I wonder, how can these faculties and solutions arise from nowhere? For the neonate, mental faculties are no more pre-installed than are the shapes of mature thought available for installation. These things have surely to undergo some process of development. How, then, can we distinguish this process from life itself?

Descola’s error, if we may call it that, is to posit, at the origin of human perception and action, ontological settlements that are never actually reached. For the one world we inhabit is not a world that is primordially the same for all, yet which offers a limited set of solutions for its comprehension, but a world of perpetual and potentially limitless differentiation, in which ‘coming to terms’ is a lifelong task that is carried on, just as life is, in the very conduct and unfolding of our relations with others. Constitutionally immersed in this worlding world, we humans do not look out from the security of a settlement already achieved, but long for one that forever escapes beyond the horizons of conceptualisation. We are dealing here, not with philosophies but with generations of being, not with ontologies but with ontogenies. If we must have a ‘turn’, let it not be ontological but ontogenetic! Ontological multiplicity gives
us many worlds, all but closed to one another. Ontogenetic multiplicity, by contrast, traces open-ended pathways of becoming within one world of nevertheless continuous variation.

Now it is my contention, in this article, that Descola’s relative universalism – with its assumed bifurcation between a given reality that is complete and fully formed, and a knowledge of it that is partial, selective and perspectival – is in truth a thinly disguised version of what otherwise goes under the rubric of naturalism. Time and again this bifurcation is asserted, not as a peculiar inflection of modernity, but as an unassailable truth. In what follows I shall accordingly devote particular attention to Descola’s characterisation of naturalism, and to what he presents as its mirror opposite, namely animism. I shall argue that to accommodate animism within the naturalist settlement is to neutralise the forces and energies of the lifeworld, such that growth, movement, even life itself come to be seen as mere after-effects, the outward manifestations of an interior principle that remains trapped and immobile within its physical casing. My alternative is not to refute naturalism, or the science that is built upon it, but to unsettle it – to recognise that even the practices of natural science, and the knowledge to which they give rise, are suspended in the currents of animate life, in which practitioners are as much immersed as the things they study. This reanimation of science reveals that what we might have thought to be a solid bedrock of reality is as charged and turbulent as the incessant churning of our own minds. Yet if the price of animism is ontological unsettlement, its reward is an understanding, founded on immediate apprehension, which goes beyond knowledge.

A Finite Number of Combinations

Introducing the work that effectively launched the systematic comparative study of cultural forms, the two-volume *Primitive Culture*, Edward Tylor asserted that human culture was subject to laws of development ‘as definite as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, and the growth of plants and animals’ (Tylor 1871, 2). Though no evolutionist, the sentiment behind this remark is one of which Descola, I think, would approve. Perhaps more than the physics of wave motion or the biology of organic growth, it is the possibilities of chemical combination that most attract his attention. Indeed he goes so far as to argue, in a concluding chapter, that ‘if anthropology were ever to discover a source of inspiration in a better-established science, it should turn to chemistry rather than physics or biology’. As the laws of chemistry limit the possible combinations of matter, so likewise those of anthropology, Descola continues, reveal that regardless of their inventiveness or creative prowess, it is simply not possible for humans ‘to create functional hybrids out of components that possess irreconcilable properties’ (p.392). There is reason to believe, however, that this logic of combinatorial finitude has deeper roots in the annals of Francophone science, which hark back to the era of pre-evolutionary biology when plants and animals, too, were viewed as working combinations of elementary components. No-one was more outspoken in this view than the celebrated naturalist and acknowledged founder of vertebrate palaeontology, Georges Cuvier.
Cuvier had a legendary knack of being able to reconstruct the forms of extinct organisms, in their entirety, from mere fragments of their fossilised remains. This knack rested on his conviction that the organism, as a thing of parts, can be assembled into a functioning whole in only a limited number of ways. From one part, the palaeontologist can therefore hazard a reliable guess as to the others. Cuvier called this the principle of the ‘correlation of parts’. According to this principle, every species represents one of a finite set of possible combinations or permutations of organic components. Forms intermediate between combinations could not exist, for with their component parts out of joint, the wholes comprised of them would not be viable. Thus there could be no variability among the individuals of a species, nor could any gradual change lead from one species form to another: there could be no evolution, in this sense. It follows that every species must have arisen abruptly and persisted unchanged until, equally abruptly, it went extinct. For Cuvier, each successive moment of extinction and genesis amounted to a ‘revolution’ that punctuated the long history of life on earth.

Cuvier’s most influential work was published in the early 1800s. Almost a century later, in setting out the rules for the new discipline of sociology, Emile Durkheim found himself arguing along exactly the same lines.2 Every society, he maintained, is a structured combination of original elements; nevertheless these elements – and in turn the combinations derived therefrom – can viably combine with others in only a finite number of ways. Every society, then, is not just the same for all the individuals who belong to it; it is also possible – at least in theory – to construct a table of essential social types prior to seeking out their empirical manifestations in the form of particular instances. Even a single representative would suffice to establish the existence of the type. ‘Thus’, Durkheim reasoned, ‘there are social species for the same reason that there are biological ones. The latter are due to the fact that the organisms are only varied combinations of the same anatomical unity’ (Durkheim 1982, 116). What Durkheim offers here, in the passage I have highlighted for emphasis, is no more, and no less, than a restatement of Cuvier’s principle of correlation. There could be no clearer proof that Durkheim was thoroughly familiar with Cuvier’s comparative method, and that he took it as the model for his own inquiries.

And now, yet another century further on, we have Descola, veritably the Cuvier of social and cultural anthropology, arguing – just like Durkheim before him – that human beings can organise their relations with one another and with the world they inhabit, and render this world intelligible, in ways that, while remarkable in their diversity, are nevertheless limited by requirements of logical compatibility and operational consistency. His entire work, Descola admits, is founded upon a hypothesis: namely, ‘that it may be possible to analyse human relations with the world and with others in terms of finite combinations’ (p. 98). Precisely because these combinations are limited in number, they are liable to reappear in the course of history, in periods and regions so far removed as to rule out any direct connection. And it is this reappearance that allows for comparison. Here again, Descola’s comparative

2 Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method was first published in 1895.
anthropology rests upon the very premise which underpinned both Durkheim’s comparative sociology and Cuvier’s comparative anatomy: that repeatable combinations of parts yield comparable results in the properties of the whole. Moreover since intermediate forms are liable to be unstable, even inoperable, transitions will likely be discontinuous and abrupt.

Nor do the parallels end there. Cuvier was a naturalist, and so – ultimately by his own admission – is Descola. He is a naturalist of social and cultural variation, just as fascinated by the permutations of human thought and practice as was Cuvier with the permutations of anatomy. Along with naturalists of every discipline and field of interest, Descola delights in systematising: in arranging everything that is, and that can possibly be, into the cells of tables generated through the intersection of more fundamental criteria of distinction. Minimally, the number of cells invariably comes down to four, generated by the intersection of just two distinctions. For Cuvier, all living organisms were of four kinds: *radiata*, *mollusca*, *articulata* and *vertebrata*. For Descola, all schemes of human thought and practice – all ontologies, as he calls them – are of four kinds: *animism*, *totemism*, *analogism* and *naturalism*. It would be tempting to match up the two series, such that, for example, naturalism would become ontology with backbone, and analogism an ontology of wormlike articulation, in which every part microcosmically enfolds the whole. Perhaps that would be to push the parallel too far. I would however like to highlight the paradox that for Descola, naturalism – or more specifically that branch of naturalism known as cognitive science – is implicated in the very delineation of the cells within which, among others, it finds itself incarcerated.  

### Acquiring the Schemas of Practice

From the outset, Descola insists that naturalism is but one scheme of the ontological fourfold, and should not be taken as the yardstick by which others are judged (p. xviii). As the work proceeds, however, it becomes ever more apparent that this is precisely how the others are being judged. Just as Cuvier’s project for a comparative palaeontology rested on a vertebrate paradigm of what it means to be an organism – to be self-supporting and capable of autonomous movement directed from a central nervous system – so Descola’s comparative anthropology is framed by a naturalistic paradigm of what an ontology is. It is, in his account, an implicit cognitive schema that enables an interior consciousness, divided from its exterior conditions of existence, to know and to practise in a world of others. Elsewhere, in a summary statement of his position, Descola posits, as a feature of the cognitive process universal to humans, an ‘awareness of a duality of planes between material processes (which I call “physicality”) and mental states (which I call “interiority”)’ (Descola 2014, 274). But is it not in the very distillation of consciousness from physicality, leading to the transcendence of mind over nature, that naturalism is constituted as an ontological regime? Indeed it seems that naturalism, in this sense, is itself installed as the very backbone of Descola’s comparative project, not only serving as the guarantor for its own confinement but also ensuring that the
other pretenders for ontological supremacy – animism, totemism and analogism – remain imprisoned within their cells so as not to upset the terms of comparison. For, were any one of them to break out, the entire comparative exercise would be thrown into jeopardy.

Descola, to his credit, is well aware of this, although we have to wait some three hundred pages before he openly admits to it. ‘It goes without saying’, he writes in a confession as startling as it is disarming, ‘that my own starting point is without doubt rooted in the familiar soil of naturalism’ (p. 303). Indeed, if the four ontologies take hold of the minds and bodies of their respective adherents to the degree that Descola supposes they do, then how could it be otherwise? How could he, Descola, a scholar educated in the great tradition of western natural philosophy, ever truly escape from it? ‘What allows … an anthropologist, whose mind has been formatted by a naturalist ontology’, as Gérard Lenclud asks in a critical comment, ‘to learn in situ and later explain the perspective of an interlocutor raised within an animist environment? (Lenclud 2014, 364). It is not unreasonable to indulge in anthropological speculations of the ‘if-I-were-an-animist’ kind, or their totemist or analogist equivalents, but it would surely be out of the question, as Descola himself acknowledges, ‘for any modern subject fully to become animist or totemist … or even to return consistently to the ancient attractions of analogism’ (pp.303-4). At the end of the day, one can only dream of what it is like to be the Other; one can never actually be the Other. This does rather beg the question, however, of how Descola came to be a naturalist in the first place.

In his classic treatise on *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, Claude Lévi-Strauss observed that ‘every new born child comes equipped, in the form of adumbrated mental structures, with all the means ever available to mankind to define its relations to the world in general and its relations to others’ (Lévi-Strauss 1969, 93). The infant Descola, then, could have ended up an animist. Had he grown up in Amazonia, where he was later to carry out long-term ethnographic fieldwork, he would undoubtedly have done so. Had he been born in France, not in 1949 but five centuries previously, in 1449, he could have become an analogist. But in truth, he ended up a naturalist. What happened? It appears that he underwent a process of induction in the course of which his naturalism became ‘deeply internalised’ (p.92). In like fashion, his Amazonian hosts ‘deeply internalised’ their animism, medieval Europeans their analogism and the Aboriginal people of the Australian continent their totemism. This is not through any explicit instruction but rather through the myriad interactions, observations and experiences by way of which children are raised within a community of consociates. This is the classic model of socialisation, according to which common language and uniformity of experience lead to homogeneity of results (p.105). Without knowing it, everyone learns the same thing.

This model of learning, according to which an acquired schema is taken in by innate mental structures primed to receive it, is naturalistic through and through. Lodged in a region of the human mind somewhere between the universally adumbrated structures posited by Lévi-Strauss and the particularity of people’s explicit representations, the acquired schema – whatever form it happens to take – lends shape to the input of raw sensation from a world ‘out there’ and direction to the dealings that human beings have with one another and with
non-humans. This, as Christina Toren has pointed out, is to appeal to the very divisions between mind and world, between form and substance, and between cognition and practice, that lie at the roots of naturalism, even to the extent of being its defining features (Toren 2014, 406-7). Consider this, for example: ‘All the concrete objects of ethnological investigation lie within the zone of overlap between collective institutions and the biological and psychological factors that confer upon social life its substance but not its form’ (p.78). Thus do collective schemas lend form to the bio-psychological substance of humanity in its natural state. So shrouded are these schemas in habits and customs, however, and so far are they removed from verbal articulation, that seldom if ever do they rise to the level of reflexive deliberation (p.98). It is in this, according to Descola, that their practical effectivity resides.

**Producing the Tacit**

But how are we to detect these practical schemas – these so-called ontologies – if they are so buried that not even those whose lives are governed by them can explain them to us? Since they are not open to direct observation, their presence, as Descola readily admits, can only be inferred on the basis of their organizational effects (p.104). It stands to reason, moreover, that such inference can be more easily done in societies that are small in scale and uniform in the kinds of experience to which their members are exposed. This, says Descola, is why anthropologists like to study remote and isolated peoples: it is not because of some nostalgia for other-cultural authenticity but because among such peoples, the underlying schemas that govern their lives are more open to detection, less obscured by the clutter that comes from the intense traffic of interactions and proliferation of external contacts characteristic of more populous and cosmopolitan societies (p.105). Whether such isolates have ever existed save as politically bounded enclaves, and whether the experience of people in remote communities is any more homogeneous than in the hurly-burly of life in the mainstream, are both extremely doubtful, but let us pass over these questions for now. Of more immediate concern is the ontological status of the schemas themselves. In whose minds do they really exist, ours or theirs?

This is an old anthropological chestnut, endlessly rehearsed in debates between Lévi-Strauss and Radcliffe-Brown and their respective followers conducted over half a century ago, and now again in this volume (pp.94-5), concerning the idea of social structure. It comes as no surprise that Descola takes the side of his mentor, Lévi-Strauss, in criticising Radcliffe-Brown’s identification of social structure with a kind of snapshot or cross-section of the actual configuration of social relations as it might be observed at a particular moment in time. As Lévi-Strauss famously put it, ‘“social structure” has nothing to do with empirical reality but with models that are built up after it’ (Lévi-Strauss 1968, 279). The structure is a model, and as such, a summary description or formalisation, in our own minds (or, more likely, in the papers we write), of what we have observed. Yet no sooner does Lévi-Strauss admit to this than he turns the logic around. Observable social relations, he contends, ‘render manifest
the social structure itself. The structure, it turns out, stands before empirical reality, not after it; it exists proactively in the minds of the people, not retroactively in ours, and orchestrates their activity from behind the scenes yet without their conscious knowledge.

This inversion, by which – as Pierre Bourdieu would say – we transfer onto the object of study the exteriority of our relation to it, ‘conceiving of it as a totality intended for cognition alone’, is one of the hallmarks of naturalist ontology (Bourdieu 1977, 96). It is what allows biologists, for example, to pretend that their generalised models of the observed (‘phenotypic’) behaviour of organisms, across a range of environmental contexts, are actually installed in the organisms themselves, in the guise of context-independent (‘genotypic’) specifications, whence they generate the behaviour in question. Thus do formal descriptions of behaviour become explanations for it (Ingold 2000, 382-3). So too with Lévi-Strauss, whose structures, built up a posteriori from the data of observation, are converted, in the blink of an eye, into a priori mental templates awaiting expression in overt social behaviour. Yet the gap between these ‘unconscious structural invariants’, as Descola calls them, and ‘the remarkable diversity of instituted customs’ – between a level of analysis that could not be more abstract and general and one that could not be more concrete and particular – seems so wide as to be well-nigh unbridgeable. Descola’s ambition is to bridge the gap by introducing a level intermediary between these extremes. It is on this level that he hopes to unearth the schemas of practice, the ‘tacit frameworks and procedures of objectivization’ (p.110), which, bypassing language, generate action more or less unthinkingly.

But the logic by which Descola produces the ‘tacit’ is no less circular than that adduced by his predecessors. It, too, rests on the trick of inversion, of implanting into the minds of the people models that have, in truth, been built up after the fact through empirical observation and rational analysis. The products of this procedure are the varieties of animism, totemism and analogism. Naturalism, in short, is not so much a variety of tacit knowledge as a machine for producing it, for naturalising the ontological regimes of the Other – regimes that might otherwise challenge the monopoly of its own way of working. That is why, when Descola turns his sights on the regime of naturalism, its underlying principles turn out to bear such an uncanny resemblance to those that underwrite his own comparative inquiry. And it is also why, in a move strikingly at variance with his treatment of animism, totemism and analogism, he goes so far as to appeal to studies in the natural sciences, of biology and psychology, to verify these principles. There need be no shame – Descola seems to be saying – in framing his entire work in terms of naturalism, because at the end of the day, naturalism has got it right! By some miracle, it has finally arrived at a mode of apprehending things that

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4 In the French original, ‘… rendent manifeste la structure sociale elle-même’ (Lévi-Strauss 1957, 306). Curiously, this passage is worded quite differently in English translation, Here, it is stated that social relations comprise ‘the raw materials out of which the models making up the social structure are built’ (Lévi-Strauss 1968, 279). We can only suppose that the translator was attempting to be consistent where the author is not!
corresponds to the way things really and truly are. And how do we know how things really are? Because we have the sciences of the natural to tell us!

The Divided Self

Introducing his celebrated essay on the notions of person and self, originally delivered as the Huxley Memorial Lecture for 1938, Marcel Mauss made it absolutely clear that self-awareness is a psychological universal. ‘There has never been a human being’, he declared, ‘without the sense not only of his body, but also of his simultaneously mental and physical individuality’. The investigation of this universal sense of self, says Mauss, is a matter for psychologists, and is not his concern. As an ethnologist and social historian, he has a different agenda. It is to show how, across societies and through history, ‘not the sense of the “self” but the concept that men of various times have created for it, [has] slowly been elaborated’ (Mauss 1979, 61, my emphasis). Underlying Mauss’s entire project, then, is an unassailable ontological division between individual psychology and collective representation: the first universal, the second socially and culturally variable. This division, of course, is definitive of the ontology of naturalism. And it is one which Descola endorses without reservation: none of the notions ever raised against it, he contends, justifies its dismissal (p.117). In this ontology, as he would put it (p.78), the psychology of selfhood confers upon social life its substance but not its form. The form comes from the very schemas of practice into which the individuals of different societies are socialised, and which comprise the subject matter of his investigation.

Is it not strange, then, that Descola should seek to defend his assertion of the universality of the psychological self by resort to the data of linguistics? For if languages give voice to collective representations, then they should surely provide us with evidence of the conceptions that speakers have of themselves, and not of the selves that they more fundamentally are – or rather, that psychologists of the self imagine them to be. Indeed in his appeal to language, Descola finds himself on shifting sands, forced to make manifestly undemonstrable claims to the existence of syntactic and semantic universals. How could one possibly prove that all languages, as Descola confidently asserts, have ‘pronominal forms or affixes such as “I” and “you”’, attesting to an ‘egocentric conception of a subject’ (p.117)?

And even if this were somehow proven, Descola’s own logic (following that of Mauss) would disallow direct inference from any conception of the subject to the psychological reality of self-conscious individuation. What leads Descola to stake so much on unproven and unprovable assertions? The risk is that one single negative example would send the argument crashing to the ground. It is a risk he is forced to take, however, in order to dodge the accusation that his entire comparative project is founded upon the particular conceptual vocabulary of naturalism. To do this he has to establish a solid baseline for comparison that is

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5 It is worth noting that later on in the work, Descola completely contradicts his earlier assertion of the universality of the subject. ‘Rather than assume the existence of the universal subject, it will be necessary to determine what kind of a subject is produced by each mode of identification’ (p.282).
apparently neutral, untainted by linguistic-conceptual bias. This baseline lies in what Descola feels safe to accept as a ‘universal fact’: namely the individuation of a consciousness that is reflexively self-aware.

This fact, however, while laying a necessary foundation for the comparative edifice that Descola builds upon it, is not in itself sufficient. By his own admission, he needs something more, and this is the aforementioned division of the self between ‘interiority’ and ‘physicality’. The first term is meant to cover what commonly goes by such names as mind, soul, consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, reflexivity, feelings, and the capacities to express oneself and to dream. The second, by contrast, embraces the physiological and sensori-motor dimensions, in perception and action, of our bodily engagement with the world (p.116). The reason why the reflexive sense of self, though necessary for the experience of interiority, is insufficient, is that for much of our waking lives, we do not feel it to be in any way distinct from the experience of physicality. Commonly, interiority and physicality are merged. Nevertheless there are situations in which they are dissociated: in ritual, in various states of trance, and most usually in dreaming. All this is enough to persuade Descola that not just the sense of self, but its division into interior and physical components, is ‘an innate characteristic of human beings’ (p.119). Here he finds support not only from ‘recent work in developmental psychology’ but once again from linguistics.

‘It would seem’, Descola asserts (though without a shred of evidence to support the claim), that ‘all languages distinguish between a level of interiority and a level of physicality’ (p. 119), and even that the distinction is ‘borne out by all lexicons’ (p.121). In European languages it is common to use words such as ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ (or their non-Anglophone equivalents) for the first, and ‘body’ for the second. But far from accusing those who would detect similar dualisms in other regions of the world of the ethnocentric projection of western values, we should realise – according to Descola – that the body/mind dichotomy is no more than a regional variant of a division that is to be found, in one form or another, among all the peoples of the world. What, then, is distinctive about this western variant? The answer we receive from Descola’s text (p.184) is surprising: it is unique, he avers, in attributing those powers of interiority we call ‘mind’ exclusively to humans. Just why this answer is so surprising is a matter to which I shall return; suffice it to note that by this circumlocution, Descola contrives to hide the naturalism that frames his comparative project by narrowing the term to a specific claim to human exceptionality. It no longer appears naturalist to assert a distinction of some sort between physical processes and mental states: everyone does that, Descola assures us, for no other reason than that it is a matter of obvious common sense. Not everyone, however, reserves interiority for individuals of the species Homo sapiens, and here, the people whom Descola calls ‘Moderns’ are alleged to be the exception (p.185). This, we

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6 The work to which Descola refers is Paul Bloom’s *Descartes’ Baby* (Bloom 2004). Bloom claims that the distinction between physical properties and mental states is biologically hardwired in human brains from birth. This finding is predictable, given that infant responses are filtered through the very same distinction, which naturalism brings to the study of child development. What it finds in the children, unsurprisingly, are the premises of its own inquiry. For universality, read circularity.
are now told, is the defining feature of naturalism, and not the universal theme of interiority/physicality dualism on which it is a particular variation.

But is it really ‘an offence to common sense’ to deny the universality of the theme? Descola thinks so (p.119). We might well agree with him that it would be absurd to suppose a living person could be either a soul without a body or a body without a soul, despite the fact that scientists and philosophers have come up with such notions from time to time. Common sense is not always as high on the list of priorities for scientists and philosophers as it is for ordinary people. However, ‘physicality alone’ and ‘interiority alone’ are not the only alternatives to dualism. Could we not work our way upstream, to a world in which interiority and physicality have yet to be prised apart?

**Containment and Immanence**

Let us return to Mauss. Can we be so sure, as was he, that every living human being has a sense of his or her mental and physical individuality, regardless of the manner of its conceptual expression? Any being born of man and woman is human, yet it is by no means clear that the human infant has such a sense. It seems rather to undergo development, in a process that has no obvious point of completion. We cannot assume, then, that the self is always already individuated. Far from having been magically completed before life begins, individuation – the fashioning of ourselves as the selves we are – is in truth a life-historic, ontogenetic project (Toren 2014, 407). Selves are not; they become. This project is moreover carried on, not in isolation, but in the company of others and with their material assistance. It is, of course, a process of social life. We might say that in this process, social relations are enfolded in the structures of consciousness, and contrarily, that consciousness unfolds in social relations (Ingold 1986, 248). The boundaries of the self, such as they are, would then be emergent within the process rather than constituted a priori. This ‘within’, however, suggests another sense of interiority, and points indeed to a critical ambiguity in the meaning of the term. Interior is on the inside, but inside what? Do we mean inside the process of our social self-fashioning? Or do we mean inside the bounds of the selves so fashioned?

We seek in vain for clear answers to these questions in Descola’s text. But reading between the lines, it seems evident that his ‘interiority’ is of a consciousness that is bounded and contained, and that stands over and against a world of exteriorities which it can know only through internal representation. For it is in the work of representation that the schemas come into play. Only in this sense, moreover, can interiority be opposed to physicality. With this opposition, the boundary separating self and world is posited as a given. In short, in Descola’s notion of physicality there is an assumption as to the externality of the world. Consciousness is ‘in here’, while physicality allows the being to engage with a world ‘out there’. For the most part this assumption remains implicit, but the occasional offhand remark gives it away. One example comes in Descola’s introduction to the first of his four ontologies, namely animism. There is one characteristic of animism, he writes, that ‘everybody can accept’; this is ‘the attribution by humans to non-humans of an interiority identical to their own’ (p. 129). By this he means that plants and (especially) animals are
taken to be endowed with souls which enable them to act both normatively and ethically as social beings, just as humans do. This idea of the soul as an inner attribute of being only makes sense if we understand interiority as *containment*, and it is true that in the anthropological literature on animism, this is how the soul-endowment of non-human beings is usually described.

We should not assume, however, that these descriptions are necessarily correct, and I, for one, would dispute them. My understanding is that among people credited by the literature with an ontology of animism, beings of every kind are seen to be ever-forming as concentrations of vital materials and energies that are, and must remain, perpetually in circulation. There is continuity here, in that everything that is – or rather that occurs – is immersed in the flow. There is interiority here as well, but this is the interiority of a consciousness that is immanent in the world itself, that participates directly in its relations and processes, and that knows by way of an enfoldment of these relations and processes into its own constitution. Let us call this the interiority of *immanence*. Quite contrary to the interiority of containment, which is consistently opposed to the physicality of the exterior world, the interiority or immanence runs seamlessly into physicality, like the singular surface of a Möbius strip, without any breach of continuity. Such interiority, indeed, can no more be distinguished from physicality than can the form of an eddy in the stream be set apart from its substance. It is the logic of naturalism, operating from behind the scenes in the production of anthropological accounts, that has contrived to wrap every being up in itself, thus converting the generative currents of its emergence into a vital agent, or ‘soul’, that inhabits an interior divided off from the exterior world of its interactions with others.

The very idea of the soul, in short, comes from looking at animism through naturalistic spectacles. Remove the spectacles, and we find that what people have actually been talking about, in words that have been translated as ‘soul’ or sometimes ‘spirit’, is not an agency hidden inside each and every being, whence it pulls the strings of action, but the current of vitality which makes it so that the being is really a becoming, not a subject (taking the grammatical form of the pronoun) but a verb, launched in a process of endless self-creation. You encounter such becomings in their going on, or in their continual emergence. Every encounter is different, and cannot be known in advance. Just as, to echo Heraclitus, you can never step twice into the same waters of a flowing river, so no experience of spirit is ever precisely repeatable. That is why animism cannot be understood as the simple inverse of naturalism. For Descola, naturalism is defined as the combination of continuity of physicalities and discontinuity of interiorities; animism as the combination of continuity of interiorities and discontinuity of physicalities (p.172). But on closer inspection, not only does the a priori opposition between interiority and physicality prove problematic; so also does the opposition between continuity and discontinuity. It is to this latter opposition that I now turn.

**The Dilemmas of Naturalism**

The problem is that both continuity and discontinuity are brought under the rubric of what Descola calls ‘modes of identification’, by means of which one can establish resemblances
and differences, or similarities and dissimilarities, through analogy and contrast, between oneself and others (p. 112). But to equate continuity with similarity is to assume an already divided world, populated by discrete, self-contained entities whose intrinsic properties are to be compared. A property that is universal is then understood as one common to every entity; one that is particular is limited to a narrower class of entities, or is perhaps even unique to a single entity. Now under naturalism, according to Descola, there is a fundamental continuity – or in his sense of the term, a similarity – among all entities, considered in their physicality. What can this possibly mean? After all, so far as living things are concerned, natural science tells us that they come in innumerable kinds, or species, and that even within species every individual is a little bit different from every other. No continuity here! But the same science – though now masquerading as psychology rather than biology – also tells us that all humans are identical in their possession of a sense of self. And that sounds like interior continuity, in Descola’s terms.

Naturalism, it seems, could be defined just as well by the combination of physical discontinuity and interior continuity as by its opposite. For in the same breath that it imagines human cultural diversity to be written on the tablet of universal nature, it also pictures biodiversity as reflected in the mirror of universal humanity. And if that is so for naturalism, then how can it any longer be distinguished from animism? After all, if we follow Descola, under animism ‘humanity’ is extended to all beings deemed to be in identical possession of interior soul-stuff, while the physicality of bodies is infinitely diverse. Naturalism, in short, reveals a world of interiority that is just as continuous as the lively and enspirited world that animism gives us. And it simultaneously reveals a world of physicality that is just as replete with difference as is the phenomenal world of animism. This does not mean, however, that naturalism and animism are one and the same. The point is rather that, compared with those of animism, the continuities and differences of naturalism are of another kind. Its continuities are indices of identity or sameness, not of movement, growth or circulation. And its differences are indices of diversity rather than of differentiation. It is not that these differences are on the inside rather than the outside, but that that they have already precipitated out from the matrix of their generation.

The differences of animism, we could say, are like the growing shoots of a rhizome; those of naturalism have broken off from the current of life and lie strewn upon that plane of indifference we commonly recognise as ‘nature’. The former are emergent and interstitial; the latter resultant and superficial. Whereas animism, then, gives us a world of becoming, naturalism gives a world of being. One is in the making, the other ready-made. And what Descola presents to us, under the rubric of animism, is a world in which every becoming is always already being, every making ready-made. Not only are the concepts of physicality and interiority at stake here, however. So also is the concept of humanity. Early on in the book, Descola explains that in Amerindian thought – or more specifically, in those variants that are exemplary of animism – ‘the common referent for all entities that live in the world is ... not Man the species but humanity as a condition’ (p.11). By the species, he means a particular physicality, and by the condition a universal interiority. But once again, this is a distinction that has its roots in naturalism and in its founding dilemma, namely, that true knowledge of
nature, and of ourselves as a species of nature, can only be had by attaining a condition that transcends it, and that makes us, in essence, creatures of a ‘more-than-natural’ kind. Arguably, indeed, the very concept of the human, in its duplicitous reference to both species and condition, is an expression of this dilemma.

Descola, too, is trapped in it, and one indication of this is the knot into which he ties himself when it comes to the meaning of the human under a regime of animism. ‘In the animist world’, he assures us, ‘relations between nonhumans or between humans and nonhumans are characterized as relations between humans, rather than the reverse’ (p.251). Here he slithers from a conception of humans and nonhumans as distinct species, in the first part of the sentence, to the conception of humanity as a shared condition in the second. If the reverse characterization does not occur, it is only because the ascription of shared nonhumanity to humans would be tantamount to the denial of life itself.7 Nor do the confusions end there, for having acknowledged that under animism, humanity is a condition open to all living beings, he goes on to tell us that ‘any being that occupies a referential point of view, being in the position of subject, sees itself as a member of the human species’ (p.139). This idea, that the human is the species form of the subject point of view, is the defining feature of what has come to be known, following Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, as perspectivism. According to Viveiros de Castro – and Descola agrees – perspectivism is the ‘ethno-epistemological corollary of animism’ (p. 143, see Viveiros de Castro 1998). Are we to conclude, then, that the common referent for living beings, under animism, is not after all the condition but the species? To what does ‘human’ really refer: the condition, the species, or both at once?

The correct answer, I suspect, is none of these. For with animism, the human is neither a transcendent condition nor a species-division in the domain of nature transcended. It is rather a realm of incipience, of becoming rather than being, or of what philosopher Gilles Deleuze calls ‘immanent life’ (Deleuze 2001). Under an ontological regime of animism, in short, the human refers to the immanence of a life that is as yet unformed. Ordinarily, beings of different kinds reveal themselves for what they are, with their various species-specific attributes. Where the ontology of animism comes into its own is in the transition from the quotidian to the numinous, or from waking life to dreams, for only then are these attributes seen to peel away to reveal a protean humanity. This is not however a move across a boundary from the physicality of exterior attributes to a contained interiority. It is rather a movement ‘upstream’ in the genesis of things, from the manifest to the immanent, from being to becoming, from the appearances of the world to the world in its appearing. Now Descola, too, urges us ‘to explore further upstream’, in order to discover the original matrices from which all action and perception flows (p.94). But again, our ‘upstreaming’ is categorically different from his. Where Descola wants to swim against the tide of representation that otherwise flows from the given to the known, or from the ontological to the epistemological, the current against which we swim is that of ontogenesis, in the generation of being. And to

7 As Istvan Praet (2014) has shown, in the world of animism, to be beyond humanity is to be beyond life. Or in other words, the condition of nonhumanity is death.
breast this tide is to dissolve the very dualism, which for Descola is a point of departure, between the physicality of the world and the interiority of our knowledge of it.

The Collapse of Mind and Nature

This is the point at which we can return to naturalism, and to Descola’s attempt to distinguish naturalism from among the variants of a supposedly universal dualism by way of its exclusive attribution of the powers of mind, or of conscious intentionality, to human beings. On this criterion of distinction, should non-human animals be discovered to be in possession of interiorities akin to those attributed to humans, the premises of naturalism could be seriously compromised. That is why Descola devotes some attention to ethological studies purporting to show that certain non-human animals are capable of representing and acting upon intentions. For example, Donald Griffin – renowned for his discovery of the uses of echolocation in navigation among bats – has claimed that even insects are in possession of mental faculties that enable them to think and plan for the future (Griffin 1976). In his view, only anthropocentric prejudice prevents us from recognising that animals make conscious choices with the intention to produce certain results, just as we humans do. Others dismiss Griffin’s claims as anthropomorphic fantasy, and the issue remains intensely controversial among specialists in animal behaviour. After reviewing some of the evidence, Descola sides with the sceptics. This, in itself, is unsurprising. What is surprising is Descola’s assessment of the ontological consequences, should Griffin and his followers turn out to be right.

‘Are we ready to accept’, Descola asks, ‘that some [non-human animals] may have an interiority comparable to our own, which would open up a considerable breach in the citadel of naturalism?’ (p.184, my emphasis). Why should he think that the discovery of mental capacities in animals could possibly sink the naturalist paradigm? After all, Griffin was by no means the first to attribute mentality to non-humans. Even Charles Darwin (1881), who never doubted the distinction between reason and nature, or between intelligence and instinct, accorded a measure of intelligence to the lowly earthworm, and progressively more to creatures further up what he – along with a long line of predecessors – saw as the scale of nature. Was Darwin not a naturalist? And how about Lewis Henry Morgan, the grandfather of modern anthropology, whose still unsurpassed studies of the American beaver led him to insist that like any human engineer, the animal would hold up an image of its work before its beaver mind as a guide to construction? The beaver has its thoughts just as we do, Morgan insisted, but being mute it cannot tell us about them (Morgan 1868, see Ingold 1988). It is true, of course, that the attribution to non-humans of powers of symbolic representation and self-conscious deliberation would loosen to breaking point the connection, epitomised in the modern concept of the human, between the condition and the species. But it does nothing to undermine the foundations of naturalism itself, of which the division between condition and species is a product. For in the entire debate about human and non-human mentality, the paradigmatic naturalistic understanding of mind, as a cognitive capacity to form interior mental representations, and to act upon them, remains unchallenged.
What would blow a hole in the paradigm – and by the same token, in Descola’s comparative project – would be to collapse the most fundamental division on which it rests, namely between the ‘two kingdoms’, respectively interior and exterior, of mind and nature. A number of modern scholars have indeed challenged this division along with its corollaries: that the domains of mind and world are mutually exclusive and separated at the skin, that to know the world is to represent it in the mind, that to act is to execute a prior intention. To shore up his defences, Descola needs to show that what these scholars are proposing, despite their subversive or heterodox posturing, are really but thinly disguised versions of naturalism. To this end, he reviews the so-called ‘enactivism’ of Francisco Varela and his collaborators, the ecological psychology of James Gibson and the neuronal determinism of Pierre Changeux, all of which seek, in different ways, to topple the mind from the high point of its interior seclusion and to restore it to the hurly burly of organism-environment interactions (pp.185-191). This, too, is to repudiate any absolute division between human and non-human realms. There is a certain irony here. How can Descola, at one and the same time, question the naturalism of those who would raise non-human animals onto a plane of mentality shared with humans, while insisting on the naturalism of those who would level the playing field by bringing the mind, as it were, back down to earth? If the denial of human exceptionality disqualifies the naturalism of the former, despite their appeal to the duality of mind and nature, how can it reveal the naturalism of the latter, despite their denial of the duality?

To take Gibson as a case in point, it is true that despite protestations to the contrary, there elements of naturalism in his thinking. Nevertheless, Gibson remained an implacable critic of cognitivism, refusing outright any ontological division between an interior consciousness and the physicality of its conditions of existence. Perception, he argued, is an achievement of the whole organism (human or non-human), moving around in and exploring its environment, not of an isolated mind in processing the data of sense. Descola, however, is out to show that at heart, Gibson adhered to the dualism of mind and nature. The argument he adduces to do so runs along the following lines. Imagine a machine such as a digital computer, which is designed on the principles of artificial intelligence with functions of data processing and symbolic representation. This machine would possess all the features that, according to Gibson, living organisms lack. Therefore, the division between mentality and physicality is still there, though here transposed onto one between machines and organisms. We would have ‘on the one hand, machines that possess interiorities because human artifice so designed them and, on the other, human and nonhuman animals which, given their intrinsic vitality, can dispense with interiorities altogether’ (p.188). The former have minds, even if the latter do not!

This argument is frankly bizarre. What seems to have happened is that Gibson’s epistemological opposition to cognitive science has been converted into an ontological opposition between the physical and the mental. In this conversion, both Gibson and his opponents, the theorists of artificial intelligence, have become ciphers, standing in

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8 It is rather surprising that Descola makes no reference to Gregory Bateson, whose work has perhaps offered the most consistent and anthropologically informed challenge in this regard. See, for example, Bateson (1980).
respectively for physicality and interiority! Indeed Descola’s inability to think outside his own epistemological box leads to profound misrepresentation, for quite apart from the fact that Gibson had nothing to say about digital computers, Descola fails to appreciate the force of the distinction that Gibson draws between ‘physical world’ and ‘environment’ (Gibson 1979, 8). The difference is that environment is a relational term: it refers not to the reality of a world that exists in itself, quite independently of the presence of any organism to perceive it, but to reality for the organism whose environment it is (Ingold 2000, 167-8). Taken in this sense, it defies any distinction between interiority and physicality. That is why it makes no sense for Descola to suggest that for Gibson or for any other theorist critical of naturalism, bodies are seen to be merely ‘plugged in’ to their environments (p.187). By thus collapsing environment into ‘nature’ and then invoking mind as its necessary complement, Descola contrives to make Gibson sound like a closet mind-nature dualist when in reality he was nothing of the sort. For all his faults – and these were many – Gibson at least pointed a way out of the fallacies of naturalism within which Descola remains irretrievably mired.

**Production and Transmission**

In the final part of the book, Descola turns from modes of identification to modes of relations, and the possibilities opened up by their comparison. He identifies six major categories of relations, under the terms exchange, predation, gift, production, protection and transmission (p.311). Here I want to focus on just two of these, production and transmission.

Descola begins with a sense of production taken directly from what he calls ‘the heroic model of creation’, underwritten by the authority of classical Greek philosophy and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. This is the idea of production as the active imposition of ideal form upon formless matter. It is this paradigm of creation-production, Descola thinks, that accounts for the prevalence in western discourses of metaphors of craftsmanship. For the craftsman, he continues, ‘possesses his own plan of the thing that he will bring into existence and gives himself the technical means to realize his intended purpose by projecting his will upon the matter that he manipulates’ (p.323). There is no doubt that the heroic model has earned a central place in modern discourses on production. It is not the case, however, that craftsmen of the western world have always thought of their work in this way. Throughout the medieval period, and even into early modernity, craft was understood as a devotional task – a kind of wayfaring – which, through practice and discipline, could bring the maker closer to the experience of God (Carruthers 1998). The work of the craftsman was to open up a path, a way of life even, along which immanent form would gradually be revealed.

This is about as far from the heroic model as can be imagined. The humble craftsman, rather than standing aloof and imposing his designs upon a world ready and waiting to receive them, is but an accomplice in among the processes that give rise to the forms we see around us; his role to assist in bringing them forth (Ingold 2013, 21). Now to ‘bring forth’ is to produce in its most literal sense. There seems no good reason, therefore, to limit the meaning of production to the sense that the heroic model has conferred upon the term. When, according to Chinese philosophy, the order of things is understood to be not imposed from above but
emergent from their continuous development, or when basket-makers among the Wayana of Amazonia reveal in their weaving the bodily forms of their animal spirits – to take two examples adduced by Descola (pp.322-4) – the idea of production as an engendering or bringing forth seems entirely apt. Descola, however, will have none of it. Whether our concern be with ‘the concept of a continuous autopoeitic process as expressed in Chinese thought or the priority that, in Amazonia, is granted to reciprocal transformation over fabrication ex nihilo’, he writes, ‘to speak of “production” … is at best … an abuse of language that leads to false parallels’ (p.325).

Abuse of language? This is a grave accusation to level at those who might seek to reclaim ‘production’ in its original sense. Even Karl Marx, in his struggle to demonstrate the ultimate priority of production over consumption, had resort to this sense in arguing that, fundamentally, what the labours of human beings produce are not objects of use but the ‘actual material life’ of the producers themselves (Marx and Engels 1977, 42). Nor is it only human lives that are brought forth in this endeavour. For example in helping to establish the conditions for the growth and flourishing of plants and animals, farmers and herdsmen also produce the lives of their crops and herds. Could we not, therefore, apply the notion of production equally to work with animals, as in herding or stock-raising? Descola thinks not, ‘since the direct action exerted upon the animals is of an entirely different order from the work of a craftsman or worker in fashioning an artefact out of inorganic material’ (p.326, my emphasis). Once again, it seems, Descola’s naturalism has got the better of him: it is what leads him to draw an absolute distinction between making, as the imposition of mind on nature, and growing as a sui generis process in nature. Most practising husbandmen and craftsmen would disagree. They would say that to produce is not to impose upon but to join with and attend to plants, animals and materials, to enter into the processes of their formation and to bend these processes to an evolving purpose. This is as much about growing as it is about making. Or more strictly, it is about making-in-growing, a process wherein the practitioner’s interventions do not so much creatively transform the world as assist in the world’s creative transformation of itself (Ingold 2011, 6; 2015, 120-4).

Turning to transmission, for Descola this is ‘above all what allows the dead, through filiation, to gain a hold over the living’ (p.329). It is the weight of ancestral past that ever presses on their descendants in the present, ‘passed on inexorably from one generation to the next’ (p.331). Now while I would not go so far as to accuse Descola of an abuse of language – as he accuses those who would use the term ‘production’ in any sense other than that bequeathed by high modernity – I would point out that the concept of transmission is ill suited to describe the pressure of the past upon the present. It suggests, to the contrary, the communication, across the generations, of a package of heritable attributes that are given, independently and in advance of the life that is undergone by successive cohorts of recipients.

The assumption that what is passed on across generations are only the attributes of identity, while the lives that enact them are expended in each generation in turn, is foundational to what I have called the ‘genealogical model’ (Ingold 2000, 134-9). Here there is no acknowledgement of what the present owes to the past for its continuation, nor are the people
of the present tasked with carrying on the work of their forbears. For with transmission, what is ‘passed on’ is not the current of life itself but the specifications for living it. Carrying on or perdurance is one thing, transmission quite another, and the consequences of confusing the two are all too apparent in Descola’s discussion of the genealogical model (p.333). No-one could deny that around the world and throughout history, people have been telling their stories by retracing the genealogical trails of their ancestors. It is not they, however, who are applying the genealogical model. It is rather anthropological analysts such as Descola, who, having first collected and recorded these stories of perdurance, would cut them up into successive generational moments, each collapsed into a point, only to reconnect them by lines of transmission (Ingold 2007, 116-19). What this procedure returns to us is not living memory but the ghost of history.

**Epilogue**

*Beyond Nature and Culture* is an intensely conservative book. It takes us back to the venerable traditions of comparative anthropology, secure in the academy and undisturbed by the intellectual and political turmoil of the contemporary world. Beautifully wrought in prose of rotund elegance, it could be likened to a skilfully carpentered and elaborately ornamented chest of drawers, such as might be found in a French *château* or, in its exquisite translation by Janet Lloyd, in an English country mansion. Today, the mansion is no longer inhabited by its erstwhile aristocratic owners but has been turned into a museum. Visitors to the museum have the opportunity to examine the chest and its contents.

The chest, we suppose, has four drawers. Open the first, and you will find it packed with masks, drums, feathers and other shamanic regalia. Inside the drawer they seem sad and lifeless, even dull; without the winds of vitality that once animated them, they are but empty shells. Open the second, and it turns out to be full of bones and pieces of wood, some straight like sticks, others curved like boomerangs, and yet other hollowed out. The bones are of both humans and animals; indeed it is hard if not impossible to tell them apart. Etched into the wooden pieces, however, are strange designs of almost geometric abstraction but unfathomable meaning. In the third drawer you find an assortment of curious instruments – of magic, divination, astrology and alchemy – that might have once been used for detecting or influencing the course of events in a world where anything can affect anything else and nothing is as it seems. Open the fourth, however, and it turns out to contain a pile of papers, on which are drawn plans and diagrams for the chest itself, with full details of its construction. The drawers, of course, are respectively of animism, totemism, analogism and naturalism. And as with Descola’s book, it is the fourth drawer, of naturalism, that contains the template for the entire work.

How different it would be, were the contents of the drawers returned to the open air! Here, the papers in the fourth drawer would not fare well. Lashed by wind and rain, the lines of the diagrams would soon wash out, and the paper would become crumpled and torn. The instruments in the third drawer would do better: restored to the hands of human practitioners, they could once again help them navigate a course among the elements and under the stars.
Returning the bones of the second drawer to the earth would re-establish the bonds between the people and animals to which they once gave substance, and the land that bore them. No sooner is this done than the designs on the wooden objects would start to speak and sing. But the contents of the first drawer would fare best of all. For life, growth and movement—evidenced in wind and weather, in the seasonal flourishing of plants and reappearance of migratory animals—are the beating heart of animism. Put the contents back inside the drawer, however, and this heart is ripped out, only to be added as an appendage. Life, growth and movement: within the drawer these things can only be imagined as the derivative emanations of an exterior physicality, masking an invisible and immobile interiority that vanishes on the instant that the drawer is opened. It is my contention that if we are truly to go beyond nature and culture, then we must abandon the chest of drawers for the atmosphere, the museum for the world of earth and sky. For this is the world that we human beings, along with other creatures, actually inhabit.

References


Biolatry: A Surrender of Understanding (Response to Ingold's *A Naturalist Abroad in the Museum of Ontology*)

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Although Tim Ingold and I have been discussing each other’s work for some time, even publicly (Descola and Ingold 2014), I had not yet heard his comments on *Beyond Nature and Culture* and I was curious to see the kind of reaction that it might elicit from him as I have always benefitted from his criticisms. I have not been disappointed. Departing occasionally from the generally affable tone he uses with me, he expresses an intense dislike not only for the book itself but also for what, in his view, it stands for: the latest expression of the manic propensity of some French scholars, starting with Cuvier – and implicitly, earlier on, with the arch-villain Descartes – to dissect in labelled parts and then artificially reassemble the panting bodies of organisms and collectives, instead of having the good sense to try, as he does, to understand how the generation of being comes about. No wonder then that our lofty lot – the likes of Durkheim, Mauss and Lévi-Strauss – prefer the dark cellars of the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, the filing cabinets of the Collège de France and the ornate chest of drawers of our now decrepit chateaux to the hurly-burly of life in the world and the thrills of experiencing the flow of time among associate bodies. Thus safely insulated by a vast array of mediations from the flux of becoming, we can steadily convert the rough matter ‘out there’ into fixed categories and cognitive imperatives which become available for any systematisation that suits our fancy. The scene resembles a depiction of the Last Judgement: to the left, the Parisian naturalist is doomed to join the mummified relics of his forbears,
while, on the right, the jubilant congregation of biophiles marches behind its prophet towards a future where the reward, like that of animism, will be “an understanding, founded on immediate apprehension, which goes beyond knowledge” (some people would call that faith). Obviously our ways have parted, without dissolving, I hope, the bond of friendly respect which Ingold and I have for each other.

I cannot answer for what Ingold writes on Durkheim, Mauss and Lévi-Strauss: anyone can read them. Anyone can read also in *Beyond Nature and Culture* what I write on the nature of my debts to, and the scope of my discrepancies with, these immense scholars, and thus judge whether my theoretical endeavours are completely contiguous with theirs, or not. Of course, I am not unhappy to be lumped with them in spite of our differences, but I am even happier that my book, like theirs1, has stirred such strong reactions in a scientific milieu which appeared for a while to be intellectually anesthetized and suffering from an acute spell of Bongo-bongoism. During the past ten years I have been criticised in a number of languages (*Beyond Nature and Culture* has had an earlier life before its English translation) for being either a sort of Gallic Castaneda, a militant and gullible hyper-relativist intent on undermining the foundations of Western civilisation, or a narrow-minded positivist desperately trying to preserve the said foundations, especially their epistemological ones, against the potent tide of radical Otherness and the obviousness of a phenomenologically-grounded dwelling perspective. The fact that I displease both sides is a source of satisfaction to me, and perhaps an indication that I am not so far off the mark. But the result of all these commotions is that it has persistently distracted me from other fields of concern I am now engaged into, particularly the investigation of how the supposedly lifeless contents of the drawers are brought alive as images and collective actions. As a consequence, I am somewhat weary of keeping on with the after-sales service, especially when the users have not read the numerous notices (sometimes written, it is true, in exotic languages) that I have issued in the meantime to answer previous queries (Descola 2006; 2010; 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c).

This is why I am reluctant to deal with Ingold’s every criticism: some have already been answered elsewhere, others are accidental or deliberate quid pro quos2 and most of them are not criticisms at all but a priori indictments for not sharing his philosophical views. Also, I find deeply true a remark by Paul Valéry (1957-60, 1507) which I already quoted in a previous rejoinder: “once published, a text is like an appliance which anyone can use as one pleases; it is not sure that its builder uses it better than anyone else”.3 My readers and the

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1 Remember, among others, the “useless Durkheim” (title of an essay by Charles Tilly, 1981) or the “technocratic totalitarianism” of Lévi-Strauss” (Diamond, S. [1974], 297).

2 Such as when Ingold persistently confuses his definition of naturalism as cognitive realism with my ontological definition of it as a combination of physical continuity and moral discontinuity; or when he chooses to qualify my conception of interiority as an internal cognitive device when I see it as an inward disposition the existence of which can only be ascertained through its outward effects; or again when he objects that my definition of production as the imposition of a design upon matter does not tally with the practice of the craftsman, when it should be obvious that I am referring to how production is conceptualised, not to how people actually experience the fashioning of artefacts or bodies.

3 My translation; the full passage is as follows: “il n’y a pas de vrai sens d’un texte. Pas d’autorité de l’auteur. Quoi qu’il ait voulu dire, il a écrit ce qu’il a écrit. Une fois publié, un texte est comme un appareil dont chacun
readers of Ingold’s review article are mature enough to make up their minds as to whether the latter’s criticisms are justified or not without my trying to redress at all costs the orthodoxy of the canon against what I would feel are warped interpretations. This is for religious zealots. However, there are a few points which deserve to be discussed because they go way beyond our local controversy: one is the question of unmediated knowledge, another is the question of models, while the last question – and I agree with Ingold that it is the most important one – is “now where do we go?”

I have made absolutely clear in Beyond Nature and Culture that a great part of the skills and knowledge thanks to which humans continuously grow into competent agents in their worlds are acquired through interactions with other agents, be they humans or nonhumans, and for the most part speechlessly. This is far from a ‘representationist’ stance. My difference with Ingold is that I surmise, on the one hand, that this process of worlding does not unfold randomly but follows certain bifurcations that can be reconstituted and modelled — more on modelling later — and, on the other hand, that we can gain a partial knowledge of this process via the mediations that humans make use of when they exchange signs between themselves and with nonhumans. I will not dwell here on the first dimension: enough has been written on it by me and my commentators for the reader to form her own judgement. The second point, however, is of concern to all anthropologists (and much beyond): if humans, as Ingold writes, “long for [an ontological settlement] that forever escapes beyond the horizons of conceptualisation”, how, glued as we are to this telos of unexpressibility, do we account for what people do, for what people say they do and for what we think we are doing when we account for that? How are we to describe an (animist) consciousness that is, Ingold writes, “immanent in the world itself, that participates directly in its relations and processes”, if we have no clues as to how humans who experience this consciousness consciously express it? One could try empathy, meditation or gedankenexperiment, but then there would be no point in travelling to distant places to painstakingly record the local accounts of this self-consciousness. As most philosophers do, I could be content to sit in my armchair or walk in the park, and intuit that my experience of the world does not differ basically from that of my Achuar friends in Amazonia: in a way we all “participate directly in the relations and processes of the world”. If I have chosen not to do so, if I have left a career of professional philosopher to go to the Achuar, it was because I suspected that the Achuar — although we probably experienced in similar ways the multiple thrills of being alive and, later, the excitement of pursuing a peccary in a marsh or the elation of navigating a dugout canoe full speed in the rapids — did not account for these experiences in my own terms.

And how were these accounts expressed? By the means of signs — whether linguistic, iconic or indexical — that circulate between humans and, in a lesser measure, between humans and nonhumans; signs as visible or audible tokens that stand for something else; signs which ‘represent’ an event, a mental state, an emotion, a state of affairs, a dream. Unfortunately, unmediated knowledge of the kind that Ingold sees as the stuff out of which our awareness of the world grows and changes is mostly inaccessible to ethnographic enquiry. So we have to

se peut servir à sa guise et selon ses moyens: il n’est pas sûr que le constructeur en use mieux qu’un autre” (Valéry, 1957–1960, 1507).
rely upon what people say that they experience rather than upon what they directly experience. It is highly probable that an animist soul or spirit, as Ingold writes, “is not an agency hidden inside each and every being […] but the current of vitality which makes it so that the being is really a becoming”. Phenomenologically, it is indeed the unrepeatable experience of a fugitive presence or of a fragmentary encounter with a not entirely perceptible being which forms the experiential basis of animism. However, when the ethnographer transcribes into a general statement on the local theory of the self what his hosts say in equally general terms on how they interpret such events, then the result becomes a general proposition of the kind that Ingold himself wrote some years ago on the human and non-human person in circumpolar societies: “a fundamental division is always recognized into two parts; an interior, vital part that is the source of all awareness, memory, intention and feeling, and an exterior, bodily covering that provides the equipment and confers the powers that are necessary to conduct a particular form of life” (Ingold 1998, 194). It is true that this statement neatly separating interiority and physicality was written at a time when Ingold was paying more attention to what people were saying than to the intimations of his inner self. It may be unfortunate for the advocates of a non-representationist gnoseology, but these kinds of general propositions, inasmuch as they provide divergent interpretations of otherwise convergent experiences of being in the world, are the elementary particles of our trade. Which leads us to the question of models.

What I call modes of identification are undoubtedly models and, to answer Ingold’s question, it is in the mind of the analyst – the die-hard Parisian naturalist – that they can be found in the first place, but that does not preclude that they may exist somewhere else. Before I substantiate this proposition, however, let us return for a moment to the famous debate between Lévi-Strauss and Radcliffe-Brown on social structure to which Ingold alludes. For it seems to me that he misinterprets Lévi-Strauss, as do many of his British colleagues who were initially raised on the milk of structural-functionalism. What Lévi-Strauss and Radcliffe-Brown had in common was deductive generalisation, that is, the detection within a great number of ethnographic and historical cases of features that can be arranged according to meaningful patterns. This approach offers a stark contrast with what now passes for anthropology, that is, short-range inductive generalisations stemming out of ethnographic particulars, usually in the (mostly implicit) Kroeberian mode of a historically grounded descriptive integration based on an ever-widening circle of contextualization of particulars (Kroeber 1952). And since it is difficult to ascertain where the proper and meaningful level of context does stop, most inductive generalisations will limit themselves empirically to what the analyst can observe and will thus transmute ethnography (often very insightful) into default anthropology (often very rustic).

In spite of being both initially inspired by Durkheim, however, the deductive generalizations of Lévi-Strauss and Radcliffe-Brown were polar opposites. The method of the latter was typological, it operated by isolating from their context institutional forms of action and interaction between humans, and subsuming them under types and subtypes that were
constructed out of the apparent similarities of the features retained to specify them. As a nomothetic science, the purpose of which was to elicit laws by means of the comparative method, anthropology was akin to a natural science, not so much astrophysics or geology as taxonomy, a morphological typology that chooses to ignore variations in favour of fixed features a priori isolated as constituting a class, which is why this form of comparatism was famously dubbed by Edmund Leach (1961, 2-3) as butterfly collecting.

The rival form of deductive generalisation is best expressed in Levi-Strauss’ (1958, 34) celebrated remark about comparison: “Generalisation is not based on comparison, but the reverse”. What Lévi-Strauss means here is that comparison is not a form of discovery but a process of ascertaining in different contexts what is already known through generalisation. Comparison is thus a process of verification which enables to rescue sets of similarities and differences and to convert them into variables within an arbitrarily defined group of transformation. This approach is indeed more faithful to the deductive method as Durkheim (1960 [1897]; 1973 [1897]), established it than the typological comparison advocated by Radcliffe-Brown; and it draws its inspiration from another branch of the natural sciences, the morphogenesis of D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson. It is the method that Lévi-Strauss uses, for instance, when he studies the laws of marriage operating in elementary systems of kinship. As these laws can be represented in models where individuals are distributed in marriage classes, one can posit that an element constitutive of the system of social relations (the relation of exchange between two marriage classes, for instance) corresponds to an element constitutive of the model (a relation of permutation between units represented by symbols) (Lévi-Strauss, 1967 [1949]). The deductive character of the model accrues from the fact that it provides a structure which is reputedly isomorphic with the process studied, the deductive transformations operated within the model being conceived as homologous to the transformations of the real phenomena. The structural model which results from this operation does not aim at the faithful description of a social reality nor does it constitute, as Ingold writes, “an a priori mental template awaiting expression in overt social behaviour”; it is a heuristic device which provides the syntax of transformations allowing the analyst to move from one variant to another within a class of phenomena. Structural analysis in anthropology is nothing but that: it reveals and orders contrastive features so as to discover the necessary relations organising certain domains of social life.

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4 Radcliffe-Brown’s method is forcefully exposed in his introduction to Structure and Function in Primitive Society (1952). Typological comparatism by no means stopped with Radcliffe-Brown. Cross-cultural surveys such as that developed within the Yale Human Relations Area Files project (see Murdock, G. P., C. S. Ford, et al., (2006) or the wide-ranging classifications of institutions propounded by Alain Testart, for instance in Testart, A. (2005) are contemporary examples of the Radcliffe-Brownian comparative programme taken seriously.

5 My translation of “Ce n’est pas la comparaison qui fonde la généralisation, mais le contraire” (Lévi-Strauss 1958, 34).

6 See my comment of the two forms of morphogenesis, Goethean and Thompsonian, in Descola (2012).

7 In the Elementary Structures of Kinship, Lévi-Strauss does invoke cognitive imperatives – the necessity of rules, the notion of reciprocity and the synthetic nature of the gift – but these are deemed to be the basis of the institutions of marriage and have nothing to do with the actual architecture of the structural models of marriage alliance (see Descola 2009).
In *Beyond Nature and Culture*, the modes of identification – animism, totemism, naturalism and analogism – are anthropological models in that sense: within the group of transformation that their contrasts constitute, their aim is to illuminate the reasons why certain institutions, modes of relation, theories of the self, forms of collectives or regimes of temporality are compatible or not between themselves. To this purely heuristic dimension of the structural models, I have added a hypothetical proposition: that the modes of identification might also function as triggering devices for schematising experience and integrating practices and statements into coherent patterns among groups of people living together. The tendency to make ontological inferences of a certain kind would then become progressively dominant during the ontogeny in a social milieu. For I have made clear a number of times that any human, according to circumstances, can make inferences along the lines of a naturalist, an animist, an analogist or a totemist regime. What socialisation most likely does is to inhibit the production of non-standard inferences and foster the systematisation by each individual of a personal ontology which will *grosso modo* coincide with that of her consociates.8 These inferential schemes appeared to me as a plausible working hypothesis – they still do – and as a way to buttress the structural models by suggesting a functional homology between a deductive structure of explanation and credible cognitive processes that would be at its root and thus account for its cogency. I do not intend to prove or disprove them; this is, as Mauss rightly remarked, a task best left to the psychologists. But whatever the plausibility of the cognitive anchoring of the modes of identification, I ask to be judged not on their psychological trustworthiness, but rather on their anthropological productivity as tools providing a better understanding of the variability of the ways of worlding.9 Which brings us to my last point: am I a ghost of the past, roaming the deserted corridors of a long-forgotten museum of ontologies, or do I provide answers for pressing anthropological questions, and even more pressing cosmopolitical ones?

In his last book, Pierre Hadot has shown with great clarity that philosophy, at least in its first stages, from the Presocratics to Plotinus, was a way of living rather than a theoretical endeavour or an enterprise of epistemological policing (Hadot 2001). Very few are the contemporary philosophers who have pursued in that direction and it may well be, as Ingold suggests, that it is anthropology instead that is now in a position to help us lead better lives, provided it can go beyond simply extolling the virtues of non Western mores. But there are various ways to do so, as there are various ways to conceive what is anthropology and its mission. The way that Ingold seems to have chosen of late is a metaphysical celebration of life ‘in the open’ where collective differences between humans and their accounting for has progressively disappeared in favour of a moralising and highly normative philosophy of dwelling whose excessive proximity to Heideggerian concepts I find unsettling.10 If the sole

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8 I am aware that Ingold strongly disagrees with this view of ontogeny, but I won’t repeat here what I have already written in response to Christina Toren who holds the same views as Ingold (see Descola 2014a).
9 And there are a number of preliminary results in a variety of domains – from the sociology of institutions to Medieval history, from the archaeology of the Andes or of the European Bronze Age to the ethnohistory of the Plain Indians, from studies in sustainable development to the philosophy of care – which show that these tools can be put to use efficiently by others than me.
10 Such as Lebensraum, see Ingold (2008, 1797). I confess I had rather write ‘conservative’ books in dialogue with two socialist thinkers like Durkheim and Mauss than live my life ‘in the open’ with Martin Heidegger.
purchase of anthropology is to provide a framework for a more direct access to life, growth and movement, to the world of earth and sky, to the fragrance of flowers and the stench of death, then I fare better with Bashô, Pessoa or Rimbaud.

My own way is rather different. The combinatorial matrix of Beyond Nature and Culture is not a sterile intellectual exercise as Ingold seems to think. By adopting this device, I wanted above all to remain faithful to this basic principle of structural analysis which holds that each variant is a variant of the other variants and not of any of them in particular which would be privileged. For if I gave the structural models of the modes of identification a fundamental position, none of them (whether animism, naturalism, totemism or analogism) and none of the variants detectable in other systems which are as many transformations of the matrix – in the sociological, praxeological, epistemic, cosmological, spatiotemporal or figurative orders – can claim to predominate over any of the other variants. This was a requirement which I had set upon myself from the start so as to produce a model of intelligibility of social and cultural facts that would remain as neutral as possible in relation to our own ontology, naturalism. Ingold states that I was not successful in doing so. I leave it to others to judge our claims. More important for me is that this symmetrisation of epistemic perspectives allows for a reformulation of the basic concepts that the social sciences have inherited from the Enlightenment and which the Moderns have used, quite efficiently, to account reflexively for their own historical destiny: nature and culture, of course, but also society, religion, economics, politics, art, and so on. Each ontological model calls for specific forms of associations into collectives, specific types of subject, specific spatial and temporal regimes, specific modes of figuration and of relations to land, in such a way that the present political, institutional, economic and epistemological state of affairs, into which we appear to be glued until the end of times, can be shown as a transitory combination to be superseded by the new cosmopolitics that the state of our planet calls for and for which we can find resources in the kind of comparative anthropology I advocate.\(^{11}\)

References


\(^{11}\) As an example, see my contribution to the Anthropocene forum I organised as part of the events surrounding the COP 21 Paris conference on global warming in December 2015 (Descola 2015).


Rejoinder to Descola’s Biolatry: A Surrender of Understanding

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I must have made a mistake. I had thought that to place my good friend Philippe Descola in the academic pantheon alongside such giants as Cuvier and Durkheim would be taken as a high compliment. But instead, it is read as an expression of an intense dislike not just for Descola’s own oeuvre but for the entire panoply of French scholarship! In the courts of France, as Shakespeare’s King Henry the Fifth found to his cost, English plain-speaking can sound ill-mannered. To my ear, to the contrary, Gallic circumlocution sounds devious. And there is quite a bit of deviousness in Descola’s response. His first inclination is to write me off as a windy prophet, moved by faith rather than reason, intent on leading his congregation to a promised land of euphoric incoherence. Then he starts grumbling about all the other people who have been getting at him over the last decade, apparently from all sides. One can sympathise with his irritation at having to use up so much time on what he calls ‘after-sales service’, when he would much rather be forging ahead with new research. I have often had that feeling myself. But I have to confess that writing this critique was in no small measure an exercise in after-sales service on my part, since Beyond Nature and Culture includes some none-too-complimentary observations on my own work, some of which – I believe – are based on misapprehensions. I was anxious to put things right.

My criticisms of Descola are detailed and precise, and they are based on a close reading of his text. For the most part, Descola fails to answer them. For this failing, he offers three excuses. One is that he has already addressed most of these criticisms in response to earlier interventions. Devious strategy number one: scold your opponent for coming late to the party, and for raising questions that have already been debated ad nauseam, in languages that – as an uncouth and uneducated fellow – he might not understand. Descola’s second excuse is to say that as a scholar rather than a zealot, he is answerable only to rational argument and not to ‘a priori indictments’. I can find no such indictments in my text, and Descola does not
identify any. Hinting darkly at their existence, however, exemplifies *devious strategy number two*. This is to portray your opponent as a demagogue who offers opinion rather than reason, dressed up in rhetoric and lambast. Descola’s third excuse is to observe that what look like criticisms are actually nothing more than ‘quid pro quos’, which vanish into thin air as soon as the mistaken substitutions on which they rest have been exposed. *Devious strategy number three*: dismiss your opponent’s objections as so trivial, and based on such elementary misunderstandings, as to warrant no more than a footnote.

Indeed in footnote 2, Descola lists three such objections. The reader could well turn to this footnote as the only place in which he actually ventures some answers. First, Descola suggests that we are operating with different definitions of ‘naturalism’, and accuses me of confusing the two. This is not a trivial matter. Mine is the naturalism of the cognitive scientist, who insists that there is an independent reality ‘out there’ which can be known only through some kind of mental processing operation that converts raw sensory inputs into representations. His is the naturalism that combines ‘physical continuity and moral discontinuity’. Perhaps we might distinguish these as *naturalism(1)* and *naturalism(2)*. We could then claim that *naturalism(2)* is just one of the set of possible ontological styles which are rendered comparable within the overall framework set up by *naturalism(1)*, and that it is distinguished, inter alia, by the peculiar insistence that mental states are confined to humans. But any attempt to sustain the division between the two naturalisms would soon collapse, as indeed they do in Descola’s text as they are subsumed under a generalised notion of ‘modernity’. Naturalism, he assures us is *the* modern ontology (Descola 2013, 173).

Next up, Descola claims that I distort his concept of interiority by presenting it as an internal cognitive device, whereas for him it is an ‘inward disposition the existence of which can only be ascertained through its outward effects’. I would challenge him to explain the difference between the two. No-one, of course, has ever actually seen the devices that cognitive scientists attribute to the human mind: their presence has always been inferred from their alleged effects. So it all comes down to the difference between ‘device’ and ‘disposition’. But since I never once use the word ‘device’, nor any equivalent, in my entire critique, this is a semantic problem of Descola’s own invention and I will leave it to him to sort it out. Finally, turning to the question of production, Descola reprimands me for confusing the experience of the practitioner with the way his practice is conceptualised. It should have been obvious, he says, that by ‘production’ he is referring to the latter and not the former. Yet my critique is precisely that the hylomorphic model of production, as the imposition of design on matter, does not accord with the way in which craftsmen of the western world think about their work. They have always thought of it as a bringing forth, which is what the word ‘production’ literally *means*.

Having relegated these issues to a footnote, Descola devotes the bulk of his attention to three issues that divide us, and that he considers to be of wider anthropological relevance. The first of these hinges on the question of whether we can ever have unmediated knowledge of the world around us. In one memorable encounter, some years ago, Descola branded me as a ‘semiophobe’. It is a badge I am proud to wear. In response, I would brand my friend as a
‘semiophile’. What don’t I like about signs? I suppose it is the implication that the beings and things that together inhabit the world can never have direct access to one another – that they can never be in each other’s immediate presence. Thus confined to their interiority, they can meet only in the traffic of their outward expressions, whether these be indexical traces, iconic likenesses or symbolic encodings. Banished from mutual presence, and immersed in an ocean of semiosis, they are condemned to endless rounds of interpretation. Semiophilia, in short, rests on the very division between interiority and physicality that, according to Descola, is innate and universal to human beings. But this is an a priori assumption on his part, based perhaps on an uncritical reading of certain texts in psychology, but not at all on his experience of fieldwork among the Achuar.

For my part, I reject this assumption. I believe that beings and things can have direct access to one another. They can do this through joint participation in practical activity, and through the education of attention that ensues. There is nothing mysterious about this. It is what we do all the time. It is the way children, apprentices and anthropologists learn. And it is what lends meaning to the words they hear, and which they may in turn use to describe their actions. Far from being inaccessible to ethnographic inquiry, as Descola asserts, unmediated experience is a condition for such inquiry to proceed in the first place. The accomplishments of fieldwork are proof enough – if any were needed – of the possibility of direct perception (Ingold 1993, 222-3).

The second issue is about models. Here, Descola treats us to a lecture on structuralism, and returns once more to the debate over the meaning of ‘social structure’ between Lévi-Strauss and Radcliffe-Brown. There is no need to rehearse this further, save to note that the method of comparison through generalisation – that is, of the empirical verification of variants already deduced through a combinatorial exploration of the space of logical possibilities – was precisely that advocated by Cuvier and Durkheim for the identification, respectively, of organic and social forms. That is why I introduced Descola’s project by way of these earlier masters. Yet for Descola to claim that the models with which he deals are no more than heuristic devices, and that they have no counterpart in architectures of cognition, is surely a retraction from the position set out in Beyond Nature and Culture, where they figure as unconscious cognitive schemas, acquired and deeply internalised through a process of socialisation, and accessible only through their conscious expressions. I do not see how it is possible to have it both ways: to claim that models are a t once the artefacts of a discovery procedure and, at the same time, concretely instantiated in the reality discovered. Not, at least, without risk of circularity.

The third issue comes down to the question of where we go from here. We at least agree that this is an important question! We have our different ways. But to describe mine as ‘a moralising and highly normative philosophy of dwelling’ which comes too close for comfort to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, is a cheap shot and goes wide of the mark. In my critique, the word ‘dwelling’ does not appear once, nor is there any mention of Heidegger. Elsewhere, in my collection of essays Being Alive (Ingold 2011, 9-13), I have explained precisely what I take from Heidegger and what my objections are to his philosophy – and
these are considerable. I have shown why it was reading Marx, and not Heidegger, that initially inspired me to think about dwelling, and why I have latterly come to substitute ‘habitation’ for ‘dwelling’, specifically to avoid unwanted Heideggerian overtones. In a chapter of the book entitled Against Space (2011, 145-155), I offer an explicit critique of the concept of Lebensraum, which Descola tries to pin to me in footnote 14. How a philosophy that celebrates openness, improvisation, creativity and the generative potentials of life can be deemed ‘moralising and highly normative’ is beyond my comprehension!

Descola’s way, by contrast, offers us only a very limited number of possibilities for our collective human future, all of them prefigured. Naturalism is manifestly failing us. So which is it to be next: animism, totemism or analogism? I think we could do with some more options. Descola provides none. If there is a moral in what I have to say, it is that in fashioning sustainable ways to live, we should listen and pay heed to what people around the world are telling us, and ground our speculations on the knowledge born of their very considerable and very diverse experience. This, surely, is why we do anthropology. We do not however set out from the premise that somewhere in the legacy of traditional wisdom there exist ready-made solutions to the human predicament, if only we could find them. Life is a problem we humans are ever fated to work on, and at least on that point, I would hazard, Descola and I are of one mind.

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