Citizenship and Resource Competition in Nigeria

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Abstract: This article discusses the growing tension between constitutionally defined citizenship and socially accepted practices of “we–they dichotomies” as a turbulent component of the national question discourse in Nigeria. It examines the adoption of dual citizenship across the country as well as how this generates violent ethnic conflict. Importantly, while citizenship refers to one’s full membership of a sovereign political community acquired either by birth, naturalisation or any other process legitimised and

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recognised by the supreme law of the state, indigeneship, on the other hand, is a
discriminatory policy employed by local or provincial governments for protecting the rights
of their so-called indigenous populations to employment, political power and other resources
of the regions or states against domination by alien populations and outsiders. It is argued
that while such distinctions have been made possible inter alia by Nigeria’s multi-ethnic
character, the ensuing struggles and tensions have been driven by the normless competition
over resource allocation. These have especially been the case in instances where ethno-
territorial cleavages have been the primary beneficiaries and targets of such resource
allocation. This article discusses land as a major economic resource over which heated
ethnic conflicts have taken place in Nigeria, as well as such other contested resources as
water and education. Drawing on the conflicts between Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and
Yoruba farmers in South–Western Nigeria, it examines the question of how disputed access to
land and water has underlain an almost permanent basis of conflict in Nigeria as well as
their implications for the country’s fledgling democracy. How does the struggle over land
affect the articulation of the citizenship question in Nigeria? How have scarcity and
competition over resources affected the contest over citizenship and the forging of
nationhood between indigenes and settlers in South–Western Nigeria? How have colonial
framings of socially accepted practices of indigeneship entrenched an understanding of the
state in Nigeria as a representation of permanently defined subnational conceptions of ethnic
citizenship? What role can the state in Nigeria play towards transforming the multiplicities of
traditional societies into coherent political societies as a basis for (i) eliciting deference and
devotion from the individual to the claims of the state, and ultimately for (ii) increasing
cultural homogeneity, political integration and value consensus? Drawing on data generated
from an ethnographic study carried out in South–Western Nigeria between October 2009 and
March 2015, this study interrogates these questions.

**Keywords:** Citizenship, conflict, resource competition, South–Western Nigeria, the
national question.

**Introduction**

A growing crisis of legitimacy currently characterises the relationship between Nigerians and
the institutions that affect their daily existence. Throughout the six geopolitical zones,
citizens speak of alarming disillusionment with government, evidenced by an increasing
disconnection between the citizens and the state on the one hand as well as between different
levels of citizens, namely indigenes and settlers on the other. At issue is the competition
among members of various ethnic constituencies for scarce resources. Such economic and
political competition among members of divergent ethnic groups has intensified cultural
differences; they have polarized primordial loyalties and have ultimately strengthened the
spread of conflict. Against this backdrop, this article examines the question of how
postcolonial dilemmas of citizenship undermining the national question, particularly with
regards to the privileged access to resources defined by indigenes in the various states of Nigeria, can be traced back to colonial framings of minorities that have led to sustained ethnic conflict over access to and control of a variety of resources in the postcolonial context.

Of the variety of resources predisposing citizens towards conflict across the country, this article pays particular attention to land as compelling. To clarify, *land is not* the only resource around which fratricidal carnage and heated conflicts have taken place across the country. However, since a single study of this nature cannot dutifully examine the expansiveness of all the other issues at conflict, our analytical enquiry is largely limited to one, namely, land. Drawing on the conflicts between Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and Yoruba farmers in South–Western Nigeria, this article discusses the colonial origins of Nigeria’s land–based conflicts. It examines the question of how disputed access to land has underlined an almost permanent basis of conflicts in Nigeria as well as their implications for the country’s fledgling democracy. How does the struggle over land affect the articulation of the citizenship question in Nigeria? How have scarcity and competition over resources affected the contest over citizenship and the forging of nationhood among indigenes and settlers in South–Western Nigeria? How have colonial framings of socially accepted practices of indigeneship entrenched an understanding of the state in Nigeria as a representation of permanently defined subnational conceptions of ethnic citizenship? What role can the state in Nigeria play towards transforming the multiplicities of traditional societies into coherent political societies as a basis for: (i) eliciting deference and devotion from the individual to the claims of the state; and ultimately (ii) increasing cultural homogeneity, political integration and value consensus? These questions are central to this article.

Data were obtained for this study from primary and secondary sources. Primary data took the form of extensive, unstructured in–depth focus group discussions and oral interviews conducted with a selected group of respondents among Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and Yoruba farmers across South–Western Nigeria. These were generated in October 2009, February 2010, January and February 2013 as well as January to March 2015. According to the 1996 state creation exercise, Nigeria is divided into six geo–political zones, namely, the North–Central, the North–East, the North–West, the South–East, the South–South and the South–West. Each of these zones comprises six states, which make the thirty–six states of the federation, with Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. While South–Western Nigeria comprises Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states, focus group discussions were conducted in (i) Ado Ekiti, Ijero Ekiti and Oye Ekiti Local Government Areas of Ekiti state;
(ii) Agege, Ajeromi–Ifelodun and Mushin Local Government Areas of Lagos state; (iii) Abeokuta North, Abeokuta South, Ado–Odo/Ota, Ijebu East, Ijebu North, Ijebu North-East, Ijebu Ode and Sagamu Local Government Areas of Ogun state; (iv) Akure North, Akure South, Idanre, Ifedore and Ilaje Local Government Areas of Ondo state; (v) Aiyedade, Ejigbo, Irepodun and Osogbo Local Government Areas of Osun state; and (vi) Ibarapa East, Ibarapa North, Iseyin, Iwajowa, Saki East and Saki West Local Government Areas of Oyo state. While the respondents were purposively sampled, the selected local government areas are those with the highest occurrences of ethnically motivated land–based conflicts across the six states sampled. Sixty (60) persons were involved in the focus group discussions—ten (10) from each of the six states, with a sample of five (5) persons chosen from each of the two ethnic groups. While the focus group discussions were limited to members of the general communities inhabited by the two ethnic groups across the six states, oral interviews were conducted with thirty (30) persons at the Departments of Public Prosecution as well as the offices of the Attorneys–General and Commissioners of Justice at the Ministries of Justice in the six states. Five (5) senior government officials were interviewed in each state. Questions were asked regarding (i) their general experiences and knowledge with conflicts in the areas; (ii) the role of land as a major cause of conflict and hostilities in the areas; (iii) the connections between ethnic agitations and the struggles for land among the people; (iv) the influence of class, geographical, racial and resource imbalances in the struggles for land in the states; (v) the impact of all these factors and influences in the articulation of the citizenship question in the region and (vi) the roles played by government at various levels in resolving land–based conflicts in South–Western Nigeria. Secondary data were drawn largely from the literature on citizenship, indigeneship, land and resource competition in Nigeria and Africa, as well as the data generated on the court cases involving Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and Yoruba farmers across the six states between 1999 and 2015. The methodology was thus inclusive and participatory.

Following this introduction, this article is divided into five sections. The first conceptualises land and underlines its centrality in Africa’s political economy. The second discusses the colonial origins of the land–based conflicts across Nigeria. The third examines the land–based conflicts in South–Western Nigeria. The fourth interrogates the contradictions and dilemmas interfacing citizenship as well as the discontents underlining indigeneship in Nigeria’s polyglot federal framework. The fifth offers the conclusion.
Land and Resource Competition in Africa

As a fundamental and highly symbolic resource, land holds a unique position within all African economies and societies. Many of the conflicts experienced in colonial and postcolonial Africa are linked with the summary expropriation of land from the peasantry by various authorities. Understanding the volatile dynamics between land, its competing usages and the ensuing—conflicting—claims to its access and control is, however, not very straightforward. Examining land conflicts in Africa is particularly challenging as the contexts in which such conflicts take place are continuously changing, thus altering the complexities of the issues at dispute (Ward 2005; Ward and Allen 2010, 1–15). Yet, sustainable growth and development in Africa, as well as the continent's overall contributions to the global political economy in the twenty-first century, will continue to depend largely on the manner in which land, land–based resources and land disputes are managed. The absence of systematic analyses on the status of land, including changes in land tenure systems, as well as the integration of these insights into postconflict peacebuilding and state reconstruction strategies by various international, local and regional actors, therefore constitutes a huge gap in the literature on land in Africa.

The problematic character of land as a source of conflicts has been widely acknowledged across Africa. Empirical studies and theoretical treatments of the land question as a problematic byproduct of elite control in Africa have also been undertaken by scholars in other works. Between 1988 and 2000, a strip of sandy land on the Eritrean border was the source of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This war claimed the lives of at least 70,000 civilians and combatants in the two countries (Bond 2009). The conflict in Darfur, Western Sudan, which began as a civil war in 1987–1989 between the Arab nomads and other ethnic groups, has been marked by intense ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate killing and massive slaughtering on both sides through unregulated land–grabbing (Mamdani 2009a, 2009b). In Zimbabwe, a constellation of ethnic and racial factors has found expression around the country's land question (Adejumobi and Momoh 2002:245–51). Several years after Zimbabwe's independence, the land question has remained the most hotly contested policy reform arena in the country (Moyo 1995). Over six million people live in Zimbabwe's marginal rural lands without fertile soils and reliable rainfall, lacking control of water rights and restricted from access to the bulk of the country's natural resources (Moyo 1998). Just as in Zimbabwe, the land question is also a major national issue in most of the countries across Southern Africa (Moyo 2007).
Thus, while the escalation of conflicts over land and other land–based resources in Angola, Cote d' Ivoire, Nigeria's Niger Delta region, Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa provides copious illustrations of the numerous struggles for access to land in those countries, such conflicts also underscore the perennial failure by both the elites and the state to successfully address the development and land questions across the continent. Consequently, ending postcolonial conflicts in Africa and reconstructing developmental states in their aftermath have attracted the attention of much international activism since the 1990s. In countries such as Mozambique and South Africa, the transition from war to peace has resulted in tangible economic and social improvements in the lives of the communities and individuals. Yet, for most of the successes noted, there remain numerous instances in which peace still has only a tenuous grip on society, with conflict rapidly reasserting itself. The common denominator of those states that have succumbed to political violence has been the failure of postconflict reconstructions to address the critical issue of land.

In Nigeria, struggles for the control and private ownership of land have often taken the forms of controversial legal manipulations by the elites. The increase in the control and private ownership of land has greatly accentuated interethnic polarisation, social inequalities and the number of landless people, particularly among the rural poor. These experiences have created scarcity and other distributive pressures for the land acquisition process. Aided by the corrupt and rent–seeking orientation of the elite at the federal level, these situations have also driven various ethnic, regional and religious communities into developing subnational conceptions of ethnic citizenship. They have therefore compounded the conflict profile of the state in Nigeria. This has been the case since the 1980s. From the 1980s, armed agitation by ethnic nationalities has been the familiar language of political expression in Nigeria (Adejumobi and Momoh 2002, 247). In August 1987, a venomous exchange between a wealthy Hausa–Fulani settler and a wage labour–seeking Bachama youth in Tingno–Waduku set the stage for a two–day exchange of hostility between the Bachama and Hausa–Fulani in this village, about 80 kilometres north–west of Numan in present–day Adamawa state. At the root of this conflict were disputed claims to the agricultural land in the area. Tingno–Waduku has been experiencing acute shortage of land in the wake of (i) heavy demands on the available land as a result of intense land alienation occasioned by large–scale farming; (ii) the emergent pattern of rural differentiation and (iii) the presence of an influential community of Hausa–Fulani farmers and fishermen, which created severe pressures on the available land and water resources in the area (Egwu 1999). Although the Hausa–Fulani population has lived among
the Bachama in Tingno–Waduku for more than seventy years now, cleavages and identities have remained sharply divided along old ethnic and religious lines. The Islamic Hausa–Fulani settlers call the Bachama “infidels and unbelievers”. The host Bachama, who are Christians, also see the Hausa–Fulani population through the same prism. These heated exchanges and interactions underline land pressures as well as religious differentiation, as being at the root of the conflict in the region.

Following these provocative exchanges, the Bachama youth loudly chanted their traditional war cry, which attracted both Bachama and Hausa–Fulani folks from the nearest farms. Bachama fighters responded by capturing five Hausa–Fulani farmers who were subsequently held hostage in Waduku, the indigenous section of the town inhabited mostly by the Bachama. On hearing the news, the Hausa–Fulani community confined mainly to Tingno attacked Waduku, ostensibly to free their ethnic kin, whom they regarded as unjustly held captives. In the counterattack that ensued, two Bachama leaders—including Chief Ndewode K. Kleru, the village titled Chief—lost their lives. The following day, 20 August 1987, ex–soldiers of Bachama descent in Waduku who were mostly victims of the massive demobilization from the Nigerian army after the civil war in 1970 moved into Tingno and launched a reprisal attack in an attempt to wipe out all the Hausa–Fulani settlers. Members of the two groups fought for three more days using automatic rifles, dane guns, bows and arrows, leading to many deaths and the destruction of property. This quickly spread and led to sporadic clashes in Fada Gyakan, Tingno–Kogi, Rigange and other neighbouring villages. It took the intervention of a combined team of the Nigerian Police and a detachment of the Nigerian Army from Yola to restore law and order into these communities (Egwu 1999, 2).

In February 1992, a conflagration took place in Zango–Kataf between the indigenous Kataf and the settler Hausa–Fulani community. This attracted the attention of government at the national level. At issue were allegations of discrimination against the Kataf by the Hausa–Fulani in the allocation of agricultural land, market stalls and other business opportunities in the Zangon–Kataf area of Southern Kaduna, in present–day Kaduna state. The conflict in this area reached its climax on 15 June 1992 when the Kataf sparked off another two–day offensive against the Hausa–Fulani community after a Jumaat (Friday) prayer (Egwu 1999, 2). In the process, yam fields belonging to Kataf farmers were attacked, yam seedlings were uprooted and properties were destroyed while hundreds of Hausa–Fulani inhabitants of Zango–Kataf origin were injured and killed. Artillery guns, bazookas and other sophisticated
weapons were freely used. The violence also spread to Ikara, Kaduna, Zaria and other major cities within the state. Such violent exchanges have also been recorded in Kafanchan, Kagoro and Lere in the state from this period onward. Although they have been linked with ethnic clashes and religious grievances, disputed access to economic resources, land and state power have been central as the actual root causes of such violence.

Colonial Origins of the Land–Based Conflicts in Nigeria

Referring to the antagonisms, contradictions and struggles generated by colonial and postcolonial policies that seek to redefine pre–capitalist customary regulations guiding access, control and ownership of land as a basis for preparing and presenting land for capitalist production, the land question has been wrongly assumed to be limited to former settler colonies in Africa. Algeria, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe have been widely cited as examples justifying this position (CODESRIA 2004; Lentz 2006; Nyong’o 2013). Continent–wide studies of such conflicts have therefore not only been scanty, but devote more attention to the recent manifestations of the conflicts, thereby ignoring their colonial origins. Apart from the heavily biased accounts by local historians representing the belligerent communities, nuanced and objective analyses on the contributions of European Christian missionaries and merchant companies such as John Holt and the Royal Niger Company in laying the foundations of such conflict have yet to clarify the underlying issues. With globalisation, structural adjustments and the intensification of identity politics, many of such conflicts have both expanded and lingered, thus compelling an examination of the historical roots of land alienation and expropriation in Africa (Onwuzuruigbo 2013, 130). Drawing on archival and ethnographic research conducted between October 2009 and March 2015, this and the following sections speak to the context of South–Western Nigeria.

Following the abolition of the slave trade in the 1800s, the British encouraged trade in legitimate commodities throughout its colonies. It also empowered the Royal Niger Company to levy customs, make treaties, administer and trade throughout the areas around the basin of the Niger (Coleman 1958). The company moved into Southern Nigeria and rapidly established several settlement areas there. In pursuance of its mandate, the Royal Niger Company acquired land, established trading outposts and promoted trade, especially in cocoa and palm produce. These developments had severe implications for the land question.
First, the concentration and focus on commercial and trading activities led to an unprecedented diversion from the production of food crops to cash crop production. This created an artificial scarcity and competition over land, leading to an intensive land grabbing by members of various ethnic groups. Lagos became a commercial gateway into other neighbouring Yoruba hinterland communities. The growth of commerce and trade also drew the attention and interest of other European trading companies such as the (British) John Holt Company and the (French) Compagnie Francaise de L'Afrique Occidentale, which rapidly established trading posts across the region for the purpose of participating in the booming trade in cocoa and palm produce. These were followed by European missionary organisations—notably the Roman Catholic Church and the Church Missionary Society—which set up economic bases in order to penetrate communities and settlements across the region and beyond. Importantly, unlike the trading companies, the missionaries were more interested in spreading Western cultural values through Christianising and educating the native populations.

Second, the agency of European merchant companies and missionaries brought about fundamental transformations in the physical structures and populations of Southern Nigeria. Trade encouraged migration and rapid urbanisation in Ibadan, Lagos and other major cities across the region. Most of the migrants were local traders of European goods and servants of missionaries drawn from Hausa–Fulani migrant herdsmen from Northern Nigeria as well as Nupe and Yoruba—ethnic groups that accompanied their European masters into Southern Nigeria (Albert 1993; Osaghae 1994). By 1900, Southern Nigeria had come under British colonial domination.

It should be noted that all the foreign companies, conglomerates and interests that converged in South–Western Nigeria demonstrated insatiable hunger for land. Although they had similar reasons—commerce, religion and trade—for migrating into the region, they were not united in their reasons for needing land. For example, colonial officials needed to usurp land ownership from the traditional institutions as a basis for consummating their sovereign authority over the local population. The missionaries wanted land for building churches and mission schools with which to propagate Christianity and other Western values across the region. European merchants needed land to eliminate local middlemen, establish trading outlets and access a direct supply of palm produce from the hinterlands. The local populations needed land for farming and habitation. All these groups expressed their demands in such tones that prioritised the commercialisation and privatisation of land.
Therefore, as more new economic opportunities and pressures led to increased migration and changing patterns of production and trade, colonisers and colonised both struggled to position themselves advantageously with respect to the allocation and use of land and land–based resources (Berry 2002, 641). Land alienation—expressed in individual and state ownership of land—was the only way of achieving this end. Thus, contrary to the dictates of traditional practices, the commercialisation and privatisation of land were enforced by colonial administrators as the overriding principle of colonial land relations. Although the resistance to this policy position was brutally crushed by the colonial state, the resultant tensions—generated by the clashing of these conflicting notions as well as the contradictory frameworks of land ownership resulting from them as upheld subsequently by the postcolonial state—laid the foundations for the lingering land conflicts as well as land–based disputes across the country. Beyond Nigeria, this was much the case in Algeria, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nyong’o 2013).

For example, for the purposes of material upliftment, between 1855 and 1891, traditional rulers in Ogun state granted some portions of land to the Royal Niger Company—for example, in Sagamu, a metropolitan city in Ijebu Remo Local Government Area of Ogun state—which built its trading shops on the land. In 1898, other portions of land were sold to the same company in Ibarapa Central, Iseyin and Iwajowa Local Government Areas of Oyo state. While similar situations occurred across Lagos, Ondo and Osun states, each of the parties came into the land deal holding steadfastly to its own cherished notion of land ownership. Believing that land was an alienable property, the Europeans saw the deal as a perpetual transfer of ownership of the land to the company. Members of the local populations, however, remained faithful to their traditional understanding of land as an inalienable cultural asset. Members of these local populations thus saw the entire land deal as a temporary transfer of use rights to their European guests—a right they thought they would reclaim with time and understanding. Unfortunately, by 1900, when the British colonial administration revoked the authority and powers of the Royal Niger Company, the Niger Lands Transfer Ordinance of 1916 facilitated the transfer of land titles of the Royal Niger Company to the colonial government. Section 2 of the Ordinance effectively transferred the entire portion of land sold to the Royal Niger Company to the Governor of Nigeria. This meant that land that had been registered as Number 110 in the Register of Deeds and mentioned in the First Schedule of the Ordinance entirely became crown land. This further led to different interpretations of the intention and provisions of the ordinance. Members of
the local communities interpreted it as an invitation to exercise its hitherto suspended right of ownership of the land. Hausa–Fulani and other migrant populations artificially located in these areas understood the ordinance as providing a long–awaited opportunity to achieve a dream they had long nursed—a dream to claim part of the land owned by the state.

Many of these portions of the land under reference were left undeveloped and unoccupied by both the Royal Niger Company and later the colonial state, since the company had committed itself not to disturb present tenants or their heirs who may have wished to continue in personal occupation of their lands and houses in the land agreement. On its part, the colonial government did not take effective possession of many of such lands after officially revoking the ownership right of the Royal Niger Company to the land. This constitutes the background to the inherited land–driven conflicts in postcolonial Nigeria. Land thus became the *prima facie* cynosure for members of the opposing ethnic groups. As indigenous Yoruba farmers have embarked on chasing away Hausa–Fulani pastoralists from their areas, bitter and bloody struggles over land have ensued. In seeking to stop the Yoruba aggressors, Hausa–Fulani pastoralists have instituted several court actions. In the process, litigations and counter litigations have continued into the 1980s, most of which have elicited several endless fatal clashes, thus undermining development and stability.

**Resource–Based Conflicts in South–Western Nigeria**

In South–Western Nigeria, disputed access to land by the indigenes and settlers has underlined a basis for violent conflicts among members of the two major ethnic groups in the region. To the Yoruba indigenes, the Hausa–Fulani in these areas are migrant settlers, who should neither own nor lay any claims to land rights in any part of their communities, a claim, which the Hausa–Fulani see differently. The resulting tension created by the opposing frameworks and perceptions of land ownership among members of these groups is at the root of the violent conflicts experienced in the region, especially between 1999 and 2015. Violent ethnic conflicts driven mainly by land–based disputes have occurred between members of many opposing groups within the period under review: among members of the Arogbo–Ijaw and Ilaje communities in Ondo state; Ife–Modakeke in Osun state; Saki–Iseyin and the Hausa–Fulani in Oyo state. Other locales of conflict include Ajegunle and Ketu Mile 12 within the Lagos metropolis as well as Bodija in Oyo state. Between 1999 and 2015, a total of twenty–one (21) violent ethnic clashes based on land disputes were recorded in Sagamu, a
metropolitan city in Ijebu Remo Local Government Area of Ogun state. The conflict, which erupted in Sagamu in July 1999, not only displayed a local, ethno-religious character. It also had a spillover effect in January 2000 in Kano state. This spiral effect extended further into Ibadan in Oyo state, in April 2000, when Hausa–Fulani pastoralists killed a Yoruba man, after which an angry mob descended on Hausa–Fulani pastoralists in the Ibadan area and killed two beggars of Hausa–Fulani descent in Agbowo, a suburb directly opposite to the gate of the University of Ibadan Ibadan, Nigeria. On the third day of this gory incident, Kano city in Northern Nigeria boiled with yet another reprisal attack against members of the Yoruba community in the Sabon Gari area.

Various accounts exist regarding the numbers of violent conflicts between Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and Yoruba farmers in South–Western Nigeria. Between 1999 and 2015, the following numbers of violent conflicts were recorded in the following states—Ekiti 21; Lagos 24; Ogun 42; Ondo 21; Osun 15; and Oyo 41. The presence of Hausa–Fulani migrant pastoralists in this region dates back to the early 1950s. In many of the cases, at this period, the conflicts did not centre only on land. The basic conflicts at this period were based on allegations by Yoruba farmers claiming damages from the vandalisation of their farm produce by unguided cattle, in which the police were invited to mediate the enforcement and payment of compensations. The 1980s and 1990s, however, witnessed intense land–grabbing by members of the two ethnic groups. The significance of this period for our purpose should be underlined.

From the 1980s, recent patterns of conflict in Nigeria have forced a shift in focus to the problem of ethnicity, whose ubiquitous character now brings to the fore the frustrations experienced in the nation building project (Egwu 1998). Furthermore, beyond Nigeria, the strong desire for nation building across postcolonial Africa has largely been a totalising state–centred project, which ignored significant processes of identity formation in the pre–colonial and colonial periods—fundamental processes—which are still of continuing relevance to nation building even today (Mustapha 1998). Given the transitional nature of the period under reference—the 1980s and the 1990s—new constitutions, forms of political competition, ground rules, negotiated agreements, pacts and settlements are often manifest, which should be taken into account while seeking to understand and explain such conflicts. This is mainly because transitions are periods replete with crisis and turbulence—especially in Africa—which generate tensions and uncertainties through opening up new opportunities for political
access and competition, for venting frustrations, grievances and also for seeking redress, thereby encouraging more desperate and intense political action (Osaghae 2004).

In Nigeria, the 1980s began with a civilian democratic regime but ended with the onset of a widespread economic crisis. During this period, the price of petroleum collapsed in the world market. Export earnings declined. The manufacturing sector experienced a rapid decline in capacity utilisation, while inflation rose dramatically (Mustapha 1992). The Nigerian economy came into deep crisis. There was deindustrialisation, excessive pilfering of public resources and a dependence on the petty commodity sector for social reproduction. The social contract came under considerable stress, while pressures for democratisation intensified. For our purpose, the combined impact of the resultant economic crisis and the adjustment introduced, has been the intensification of existing hostilities over land and other scarce resources. This clearly informed the politicisation of ethnicity among members of the different ethnic groups.

As a regressive corollary, this period was characterised by many disruptive conflicts, which involved the use of several dangerous weapons. It also marked the emergence of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in 1994 and other anti– robbery vigilante groups among the Yoruba communities in these states. Lastly, it informed (i) the building of formal diaspora associations and communities; (ii) the organisation of domestic ethnic formations and (iii) the appointment of traditional rulers by the Hausa–Fulani settlers in this region. These developments became understandable given the pronounced decline of state control—especially in the areas of policing and security—which characterised the state in Africa from the post–Cold War period (Nolte 2007). These considerations not only underline the constitutional and structural constraints of the state in Nigeria as a notoriously complex and divided federation, but also underscore the importance of studying the connections between ethnicity and land–based conflicts during the period under review.

The development of alternative governance structures by the Hausa–Fulani settlers in South–Western Nigeria took place in 1995 after the first pronounced conflict between members of this group and their rival Yoruba counterparts. This took place sporadically between 1990 and 1992, during which Yoruba farmers attacked and killed 112 Hausa–Fulani pastoralists in the region. By 1995, representatives had been appointed at the local levels to represent members of the Hausa–Fulani communities. Thus, although ethnic conflicts have been on the scene since the 1980s, they have been especially prevalent since 1995 as well as the period
marking the country’s return to civilian rule in May 1999 after fifteen years of military rule between 1984 and 1999.

Also by 1995, following the appeal by the appointed representatives, the Federal Government created what it called *exclusive grazing zones* for the Hausa–Fulani pastoralists in (i) Ajegunle in Ajeromi–Ifeodun Local Government Area of Lagos state, (ii) Igbo–Ora in Ibarapa Central Local Government Area of Oyo state, (iii) Gaa Salihu Igangan in Ibarapa North Local Government Area of Oyo state and (iv) Waasinmi Aiyegun in Iwajowa Local Government Area of Oyo state. These areas have since been reserved for Hausa–Fulani pastoralists for growing abundant green vegetation, with which to meet the grazing needs of their livestock. The federal government—through the assistance of the World Bank—also provided a few boreholes in these communities. Containing very large expanses of land, these communities are surrounded by thick forests in which these pastoralists settle. Most of the boreholes have, however, dried up due to poor maintenance and the unmanageable pressures that result from the demand for water for both animal and human consumption in the areas. In addition, during most of the dry season, the green pastures within the grazing zones are exhausted. These situations press the pastoralists to expand beyond the grazing zones in quest of green pasture and water for their livestock. Such expansion unfortunately demolishes the crops in the neighbouring farms invaded before harvest. This situation brings the pastoralists into bloody clashes with Yoruba farmers, who see them mainly as vandals and accuse them of destroying their farm produce through the destructive presence of their livestock on their farms. There have also been allegations of robbery against these pastoralists by members of the host communities. Hausa–Fulani pastoralists are accused of working as pastoralists during the day and doubling as armed robbers at night. As anti–robbery attempts are directed at apprehending them, the Hausa–Fulani populations accuse members of the Yoruba communities of victimising them based on their minority status in the areas. This has also led to conflicts as well as numerous deaths.

While there have been several violent exchanges between members of the two ethnic groups, such cases have been rarely referred to the court of law. Given what they describe as the unnecessary delay that accompanies the operations of the modern system of justice in the administration of disputes, members of these communities rather resort to jungle justice through the deployment of self–adjudication and self–defence based on violent exchanges. Consequently, between 1999 and 2015, there have been only a few cases treated by the law
courts on resource–based conflicts in the region. Human lives and properties have, however been lost in the process.

More than 5,500 people of Hausa–Fulani descent have been killed by members of the Oodua People's Congress and other local vigilante groups in Oyo town and Saki in Oyo state in the period 1999–2015. Within the same period, members of the pastoral communities in Abeokuta North, Ado–Awaaye, Ajegunle, Eruwa, Gaa Kondo, Igbo–Ora, Ijebu Ode, Imeko, Ikenne, Iseyin, Mushin, Owode Egba, Oyo town, Saki, Sagamu, Sango–Ota, Waasinmi and Yewa North were hunted and pursued by members of the Oodua People's Congress—with more than 12,000 people of Hausa–Fulani descent killed and maimed. Properties have also been destroyed. The aim of the Oodua People's Congress was to eliminate all pastoral communities and abolish the idea of pastoralists settling in South–Western Nigeria.

Although governments at the federal and state levels have intervened to end these conflicts, not much has been achieved in the direction of development and peace. Local government peace and security committees have severally been commissioned. The attention of the police public relations committees in the six states has also been drawn to the need to be more peace–minded in their interactions with citizens at the local levels. Other peace–mediating initiatives have similarly been created as a basis for spurring development, harmony and peace across these states. Peaceful settlements of disputes have, however remained elusive and far–fetched. All these tensions have underlined the problematic context of the citizenship question in the country as discussed in the next section.

Citizenship and Discontent in Nigeria

The literature on citizenship in Africa focuses primarily on autochthony, ethnicity, indigeneship and other forms of belonging deployed for building structures of legitimacy as a means for accessing the collective goods within the state. In many instances, such structures are based on claims of collective identities as well as imagined or real notions of national communities (Wimmer 1997). Within this discourse the major narrative often employed for asserting an attachment to land in Africa is hinged on claims of autochthony, citizenship and indigeneship. To be sure, autochthony and indigeneship do not contrast fundamentally. Put together, these repertoires of entitlement link up directly with the articulation of ethnic conflict. Several efforts have been made to interrogate the epistemologies of conflicts in Africa (Wai 2012), yet, with respect to the political economies of such struggles over land
and other economic resources across the continent, the articulation of such efforts—using the
discourse on autochthony, citizenship and indigeneship—constitutes an alarming grey area.
Claims are mobilized based on such factors as (i) carefully rehearsed assumptions and
unproven innuendoes about ancestral understandings of land and patriarchal practices; (ii)
communal understandings of space and time; (iii) historically transmitted practices of
exclusion and inclusion as well as (iv) the acclaimed natural ordering and privatisation of
land. The mobilisation of claims based on such factors represents attempts to reify
essentialised claims about identities, obscure the dynamic nature of identities and ultimately
rigidify the very process of identity transformation through the development of exclusionary
politics (Boas and Dunn 2013, 1–33; Lonsdale 2008). The ultimate end here is the production
of an array of metaphors that construe all categories of allochthons as a threat to public health
and the entire social system. Allochthons or outsiders here are broadly defined as either
citizens of other countries who are considered as foreign nationals or fellow citizens of the
same state who are neither ethnically nor linguistically indigenous to the communities,
localities or provinces under consideration (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). The practice of
providing certain rights to citizens based primarily on their places of origin or their supposed
local ancestry is part of a global conjuncture of belonging that has become common in many
parts of the world. It is mostly articulated in the claim of having settled first in a certain place
and of subsequently being rooted in the soil (Geschiere 2009, 5–6). Such claims are premised
on autochthony and indigeneity.
The genealogy of the *citizenship* and *ethnic minorities questions* in Nigeria is linked with
three histories. The first draws on the mode of evolution of Nigerian federalism and the
character of the emergent state system itself. The second has to do with the context of forced
migration initiated by the British colonial hegemons, in which populations across various
parts of colonial Nigeria were taken to other regions to contribute to the construction of basic
infrastructure such as hospitals, markets, railways, roads and schools under the system of
forced unpaid labour. Following the completion of such tasks and the eventual termination of
formal colonisation, although the victims of such forced migration have remained domiciled
in the communities into which they were relocated, they and their descendants have neither
been accepted nor recognised by members of the indigenous communities as legitimate co–
heirs. The third history is tied to voluntary migration, in which members of various ethnic
groups move around in quest of better material living conditions, either directly for
themselves or for their dependents. Notwithstanding several decades of cohabitation in such
communities, members of the migrant or settler communities have hardly been accepted by
the hosts as belonging to the communities in which they have been based. Returning to their ancestral homelands is also not materially convenient.

In Nigeria, indigeneity resulted from three major historical processes. First, indirect rule was based on the politics of preference accorded to “the sons of the soil” in local administration since the colonial period. Second, the ideology of regionalism developed in the 1950s and the 1960s has continued to favour the citizens of one region over another. Third, federal character principles were introduced into the constitutions of the Second Republic (1979) and Fourth Republic (1999). All these three trends have moved in the same direction for more than a century (Fourchard 2015, 40–1). As Claude Ake (1973) and Mahmood Mamdani (1996) have shown, colonialism was based on the entrenchment of near–absolute distinctions between the colonisers and the colonised. Transferring such distinctions into the operations of the postcolonial state thus rigidified historically fluid patterns of identity construction. While ethnicity exists and operates mainly at the federal level, indigeneity takes root at the local and state government levels. An indigene is a member of a community within the geographical space of that ethnic group. Being viewed as biologically determined and territorially asserted, indigeneity discriminates, first, against members of the same ethnic group who are located within the geographical spaces of other ethnic groups. The claim here is that the cultural identities and other particularities of members of such an ethnic group located in the diaspora have either been compromised or entirely lost through several years of their sojourn in a foreign land. For example, having imbibed significant attributes of the cultures in Northern Nigeria where they are based, members of a migrant Yoruba community based in Zazzau are not considered by their fellow Yoruba populations based ‘at home’—in Ado Ekiti, Ibadan, Ikare or Osogbo—as retaining the original characteristics of Oduduwa heritage and legacy. This in itself is a major basis of discrimination, to wit, within members of the same ethnic group. Second, discrimination exists from members of one ethnic group toward members of other ethnic groups. In this sense, an indigene of a particular community is firstly a member of an ethnic group—primordial citizenship—as in the case of being Egba, Igbo, Hausa–Fulani or Yoruba. Such an individual also retains her or his civic citizenship by being a Nigerian. This point illustrates our argument on dual citizenship.

Another example suffices for illustrating this point. Comprising members in Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states, the Yoruba ethnic group occupies South–Western Nigeria. Any Nigerian born of indigenous parents from any of these federating states is called Yoruba. Individuals from Ekiti state living in Ogun state are not indigenes of Ogun state. Nor are their children, who may even have been born there. The same denial applies to the descendants of
settlers coming from these states. At best, they are regarded as *settlers* in Ogun state. As a result of their settler status, such individuals can neither aspire to exercise their citizenship rights to acquire free medical care, landed property or pensionable employment; they cannot enrol in the armed forces and police services nor govern the state. Furthermore they cannot avail themselves of any of the other services that the state provides for its indigenes—such as free education for their children—as well as grants and scholarships in spite of many decades of having paid taxes and performed many other constitutionally sanctioned civic obligations while living in the area. When such individuals move to a different region within the same federation, say for example, South–East or South–South Nigeria, their identity problem is compounded on the ground of being non–indigenes in the new region to which they have relocated.

After several decades of its post–independence existence, these regressive features have continued to affect the operations of power within Nigerian government and politics. Successive political elites have also not paid any committed attention towards resolving the structural root causes of such inherited colonial problems. Hence, our argument here that the considerations that shape socio–political life in Nigeria conflict fundamentally with the demands of national development and political integration. This is clear enough in: (i) the allocations and choices of federal designs; (ii) the interpretations and uses of basic federal institutions and principles such as the underlying federal character, the creation of new localities, states and universities as well as (iii) the rotation and zoning of major political appointments and offices. Secondly, the structural root of conservative elite politics in Nigeria is the bifurcated citizenship that confounds commitment to government accountability by the citizens. Conservative elite politics is a debilitating element of Nigerian politics that accelerates governance failure and fundamentally inhibits state capacity. It produces a spoils–sharing orientation, involving the corruption of state officials, the determination of public policies based on the competition for sectional advantages, the misuse of state resources and the lack of accountability in the democratic political process. Just like clientelism, neo–patrimonialism and other internal failings of the state in Africa, this feature of Nigerian politics constitutes a familiar stigma in political culture with adverse impacts on development and the entire social structure. This mode of citizenship promotes opportunism, which enables the elites to indulge in political corruption without concerted opposition from the governed. Consequently, federalism—politically adopted as a constitutional design for allaying the fears of domination by various minorities and ensuring a balanced representation in Nigeria’s polycentric society—has been reduced to a means of
sharing federal revenues and also for distributing federal offices as political booty in the contests of a rentier state.

Our final illustration draws on the activities of educational institutions, notably public universities in Nigeria. With the exemplary exception of the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, there is no other university in Nigeria that reflects the country’s ethnically diverse demographic profile. Virtually all the federal and state-owned universities are dominated by people who are ethnically indigenous to the states in which those universities are located. The University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria is dominated by Igbo and has an insignificant representation of Hausa–Fulani, Yoruba and other ethnic groups in the country. Although located in North–Central Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, no longer reflects the federal character of the state in Nigeria. As a basis for generating funding from the federation account, Ahmadu Bello University and other universities in Northern Nigeria politically fight to be accorded the status of federal institutions as a way of shifting their economic burdens onto the Federal Government. After achieving that, they carefully ethnicise and limit the appointment of academic and other staff exclusively to people from the core states from Northern Nigeria. Rather than focusing primarily on academic merit and other objective considerations bearing on capacity and character, universities in Northern Nigeria now base the appointment of academic staff and the admission of students mainly on catchment area and other reductionist short–sighted policies, the aim of which is to exclude populations from unwanted regions. The ethnicisation of intergroup relations has thus been rapidly extended into the universities. This has significantly undermined collegiality and intellectual production throughout the country. In the 1990s, using the Northern Elements Coalition (NECO) as its militant arm, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, northernised its staff and student populations. This skewed policy decision frustrated and marginalised academics and students of Igbo, Tiv, Yoruba and other ethnic origins. Academic exchanges and intellectual interactions have also consequently been regionalised. The resultant resentment compelled academics and students of Tiv and Okun extraction to demand the creation of Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria as well as Kogi State University, Anyimgba, Nigeria. The respective local quarrels of these institutions have not only consumed them, but have also led to exclusionary politics in which there are currently no gainful academic exchanges and interactions between members of these institutions. Underscoring the exclusion and marginalisation of minorities and non–indigenes through the manipulation of official policies and non–official practices, a Human Rights Watch (2006, 1) report observed:
The population of every state and local government in Nigeria is officially divided into two categories of citizens: those who are indigenes and those who are not. The indigenes of a place are those who can trace their ethnic and genealogical roots back to the community of people who originally settled there. Everyone else, no matter how long they or their families have lived in the place they call home, is and always will be a non-indigene.

Consequently, while declarations of citizenship and rights are clearly enshrined in the Nigerian constitutions, the gap between the reality and rhetoric is overwhelmingly disappointing. Underlining this gap is the notion of the segregated citizenry in which, given the problematic context of state–society relations, it has not been possible to elicit from the citizens deference and devotion to the claims of the state (Ake 1967; Ekeh 1975, 1994). Consequently, individual political actors have yet to develop in the course of their political existence and interactions a pool of commonly accepted trans-ethnic nationalist norms regarding political behaviour and a commitment to the appropriate political behaviour patterns legitimised by those norms (Arowosegbe 2011). In demonstrating their sense of rootedness, people often express the deepest affinity to their ethnicities, gender and religions—thereby relegating the state to a mere geographical appellation or space that lacks the necessary connectedness with its ordinary citizens. Given the acquisitive and selfish interests of the elites, successive postcolonial regimes have merely emphasised differences and consequently lost sensitivity to the multiplicity of ethnicities and also failed to create nuanced governance as a basis for promoting inclusive citizenship. Nigeria has thus been reduced to nothing more than a tapestry woven together from various ethnic collectivities, but in which the component parts have refused to cohere (Awolowo 1947, 47; Awolowo 1968, 237–39). The implications of all these features for development and political stability in Africa and Nigeria have been extensively provided in other works (Evans 1995; Osaghae 1990). The problem of citizenship in Nigeria is therefore fundamentally linked with the failure to develop an appropriate political culture and to induce commitment and devotion to it (Ake 1967).

One of the latest expressions of the indigene–settler dichotomy in Nigeria was underlined by the ethno–religious fighting that occurred between the largely Christian indigenes and the minority Hausa–Fulani Muslim settlers in Nasarawa Gom, in Jos, Plateau state, North–Central Nigeria, on Sunday, 17 January 2010. Although there have been several versions of its actual causes, the crisis attracted a 24–hour curfew following the killing of 65 Christians,
200 Muslims, the displacement of 17,000 people, mostly Hausa–Fulani Muslim settlers and the destruction of properties on a massive scale (British Broadcasting Corporation 2010). This fighting was a follow–up to the series of conflicts that have occurred in Nigeria's volatile Middle Belt region from the year 2000. From this period, deadly riots have been recorded in Jos in 2011 and 2013. Residential areas in the city have been sharply divided into Christian and Muslim areas. Divisions also exist along party lines. The Christians massively back the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), while the Muslims mostly support the opposition, the All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP). Such divisions have been accentuated by a system of misgovernance, which classifies the people into indigenes and settlers using discriminatory conditions that make it difficult for settlers to stand for elections in a country where they all are citizens. As a way of minimising the casualties and other disruptive impact of the conflict, the governors of Abia, Benue, Delta, Edo, Ekiti and Oyo states evacuated willing indigenes of their states from the volatile city. The Human Rights Watch report cited in Oluwole Josiah (2010) declared that the deployment of force by the security agencies in dealing with the conflict left more than 700 people dead in Jos, the Plateau state capital. It also recounted that 13,500 people have died in ethnic and religious clashes in Nigeria from 29 May 1999 to 31 December 2009. This figure does not include those residents carelessly gunned down by policemen and soldiers in their homes, those chased down and killed while fleeing for safety as well as the innocent victims illegally lined up and summarily executed by members of law enforcement agencies, most of whom have yet to be brought to justice. While ethno–religious clashes in the region have generally been blamed on poverty and sectarianism, disputed access to land and other scarce resources have often contributed to the root causes of most of such violent outbursts as indicated in the case studies presented above. Thus, indigeneity—originally meant for preserving the sanctity of cultural identities within various traditional institutions—is now a critical factor for accessing opportunities within the state, especially at the individual level. Individuals may be born and live all their lives in a certain state, pay taxes to the state and speak the local language, yet may be barred from enjoying state opportunities mainly because they are not ethnically indigenous to that state. The more robust the opportunities in question, the more vehement the discrimination and opposition against such non–indigenes. Underlining this practice is the understanding that public offices in the context of the centralised resources received by the government of a locality or state constitute the share of the national cake accruing to the indigenes of that area and are therefore reserved only for the indigenes of that state. Non–indigenous residents must
thus return to their states of origin to access their own share of the national cake (Aiyede 2009; Arowosegbe 2009). Inter–group interactions are thus marked by enmity, rooted in entrenched notions of economic and social discriminations, hatred–infused memories and injustices. These features underline the anachronistic nature of citizenship in Nigeria. In the process, bitterness and fear are endemic, while mutual distrust becomes the basis of inter–group relations. These experiences also underline the bifurcation of the citizenry, a reality that promotes opportunism among the elites, by enabling their indulgence in political corruption without any productive opposition from the people, especially since a bifurcated citizenry undermines the prospects for collective action. Viewed in the context of the stiff struggles over land and other scarce economic resources, these developments explain the vicious nature of inter–ethnic rivalries and the high conflict profile for which Nigeria has become deservedly notorious. They also make citizenship an unresolved question in Nigeria's mono–centric rentier state.

Conclusion

This article has offered a reflection on the nature of the relations of various resources, particularly land, to the national question in Nigeria. Drawing on the violent conflicts between Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and Yoruba farmers in South–Western Nigeria—from 1999 to 2015—it has examined the role of land as a source of conflicts from the period following the implementation of the structural adjustment programme in the country. Although it focuses on South–Western Nigeria, efforts were made to demonstrate the analytical and empirical utility of the study by showcasing further examples across other regions in Africa. In doing this, the aim is to foreground the scholarly contribution of the work through creating opportunities for comparisons with other contexts and experiences elsewhere. Without any doubt, land is only one of the many resources whose contestation leads to conflicts. As we have tried to show, the land question is a daunting challenge undermining nation building and state consolidation in Nigeria. This has especially been the case since 1999—the year marking the country's return to civil democratic rule—after fifteen years of military dictatorship. From this period, the country has been vexed by numerous violent conflicts, litigation concerning fiscal over–centralisation and a plethora of constitutional crises among other pathologies that underwrite the constitutional and structural constraints of Nigerian federalism (Suberu 2008). How are citizenship rights understood by
the ordinary people across various rural communities in the country? How best might land redistribution and reforms be undertaken by the state in Nigeria? How do we transform ethnic and other forms of deference and devotion by the citizens into those of the state? These questions are central to the citizenship and national questions in Nigeria. In order to be meaningful, far-reaching and sustainable in terms of their impacts, arguments, which focus on the democratic, federal and indigeneship questions in Nigeria must be properly grounded in a conception of accountability and participation, which in the context of development actually strengthens and transforms the status of the citizens from one of abstract claimants to various resources into effective economic contributors and rightful beneficiaries of development on an inclusive and non-discriminatory basis. Achieving this is, no doubt, predicated upon the transformation of the state in Nigeria from being a representation of permanently defined majorities into a consensus-based political community that is democratically constituted, non-discriminatory, and inclusive—a participatory system of order based on the consent not just of the majorities, but of all constituents of its population. In this regard, transiting from a system of order based on alien and internal conquests to one based on the consent of the people is the prevailing challenge for most countries across postcolonial Africa, particularly in postconflict contexts.

Endnotes

1 This is a major conclusion of the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa adopted by the Heads of State of Africa meeting in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009.

2 This point was made in oral interviews conducted with traditional rulers in Sagamu local government area of Ogun state between 2010 and 2015.

3 Niger Lands Transfer Ordinance. ONPROF 11/1/1/, NAE.

4 For an example of a similar instance in Southeastern Nigeria, see the text of the judgment delivered by Graham Paul of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on the Aguleri and Umuleri land dispute in 1934.

5 For illustrations of this experience across Nigeria and West Africa, see Robert Shenton (1986).

6 This information is based on the focus group discussions conducted by this researcher with the Hausa–Fulani pastoralists and Yoruba farmers in Sagamu, Nigeria, between 2009 and 2015.

7 This incident was witnessed by this researcher.
These figures were extracted from the Department of Public Prosecution at the Ministry of Justice in each of the six states between January and February 2013. Importantly, although there were no records on the specific numbers of casualties, in all of these cases human lives were lost.

The figures for these conflicts have been provided earlier in this article.

This figure was extracted from the Department of Public Prosecution at the Ministry of Justice, in Ibadan, Oyo state, between January and February 2013. Although not with such exact precision, this information was also supported by Alhaji Suleiman Muhammadu, the Sarkin Fulani of Eruwa, in Ibarapa Central Local Government Area of Oyo state.

This is according to Alhaji Suleiman Muhammadu, the Sarkin Fulani of Eruwa, in Ibarapa Central Local Government Area of Oyo state; Alhaji Salihu Kadiri, the Sarkin Fulani of Gaa Salihu, Igangan, in Ibarapa North Local Government Area of Oyo state; Alhaji Idrissa Abubakar, the Sarkin Fulani of Igbo–Ora, in Ibarapa Central Local Government Area of Oyo state; Alhaji Rilwan O. Diga, the Sarkin Fulani of Ado–Awaaye and Waasinni, in Iseyin Local Government Area of Oyo state; Alhaji Umaru Ali Garkwa, the Sarkin Fulani of Saki, in Saki West Local Government Area of Oyo state; and Alhaji Inuwa Garba Sarki, Ciroman Sagamu, Secretary–General of Sarkin Hausawa–in–Council, Sagamu, and also, the Secretary–General of Ogun state Council of Hausa–Fulani traditional rulers. All these traditional rulers and their populations were contacted and interviewed at different periods in October 2009, February 2010, January and February 2013, as well as January to March 2015.

References


Niger Lands Transfer Ordinance. ONPROF 11/1/1/, NAE.


